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This dissertation explores the impacts of resource procurement on regional economic growth
and urbanization through a historical case study, moving on to discuss the welfare impacts
of resource-sharing in two regions. The first essay focuses on the effects of the Owens
Valley Water Transfer in the 1900s on the economic growth in Los Angeles. We apply
the synthetic control and difference-in-differences methods to determine the treatment ef-
fect from the water transfer. The empirical results show that the Manufacturing Product
Per Capita and Gross Domestic Product Per Capita was higher in the post-treatment period
with a water transfer. Hence, we conclude that the water transfer accelerated the economic
growth in Los Angeles county. The second essay extends the previous analyses to examine
the impact on the urban sprawl. In this study, we rely on difference-in-differences for our
main results owing to a much lesser degree of urban expansion in the control counties be-
fore the water was transferred. Our treatment effect from various difference-in-differences
specifications is consistently positive and significant, and we obtain similar impacts from
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the various robustness checks. Thus, we conclude that the Owens Valley water transfer
resulted in a higher degree of urban sprawl in Los Angeles post the Owens Valley water
transfer. The third essay progresses to study the welfare impacts of water-sharing between
Cache County and Wasatch Front. We apply the Nash Bargaining co-operative theory to
a general equilibrium model to compute social welfare in each county. We use Compen-
sating Variation (CV)/ Willingness-to-pay as measures of social welfare. We compare the
willingness-to-pay with the costs proposed by the Bear River Development Project. The
project will develop water resources in Cache County and Box Elder County and export wa-
ter to the Wasatch Front in the south. The results showed that the costs were much higher as
compared to the willingness to pay. We make two suggestions: i) the development of more
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Arpita Nehra
This dissertation explores the impacts of resource procurement on economic growth
and urbanization in a county through a historical case study, moving on to discuss the wel-
fare impacts of resource-sharing in two regions. The first two essays explore the impact of
the Owens Valley water transfer in the 1900s on the urban sprawl and the economic growth
of Los Angeles. The main contribution that the first two essays make is to present an em-
pirical analysis on the impact of procurement of resources on the economy. The third essay
examines the welfare impacts of a proposed water sharing and development project. The
findings suggest that the regions would be willing to pay for the water transfer only if the
increase in new resources is large or the costs are shared equally among the involved re-
gions, excluding environmental costs. This essay informs the policy of alternative methods
ensuring overall net benefit to all the parties involved in the project. Studies like the one
presented in this dissertation have become indispensable with the increase in competing
uses of water.
This dissertation is dedicated to my parents, family, and friends with special gratitude for
their love, support, and affection through one of the most important journeys in my life.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Researchers have begun to observe water as "the new oil"; in the sense that wars used to
be fought over oil in the past, and they are being fought over water in the present (Chellaney,
2013). Kofi Annan stated in 2001 that the reason for the third world war is going to be
water (Singh and Kumar, 2021). Though plentiful, the global water demand has increased
more than ten times because of population growth, affluence, and multiple uses of water
(Mbote, 2007). A good example of a water conflict is in the Nile River Basin (Fadel et al.,
2003). The woes of water sharing do not end here as there is a constant threat of drought,
population explosion, and pollution resulting in water conflicts (Mbote, 2007). Moreover,
the water conflict in some countries in this basin has given rise to the exacerbation of
political, social, and economic instability in surrounding areas (Mbote, 2007). The situation
of the Nile Water Conflict turning into a war is not unique to the region. There are various
water conflicts in the world, that started historically and have continued causing problems
till the present day. This dissertation studies one of these conflicts, i.e., the Owens Valley
water conflict and, explores the impacts that the water transfer had on the urban expansion
and growth of Los Angeles historically, and then examines an existing water-sharing project
proposed in Utah.
With the increase in the amount of water transfers as a water management strategy,
it has become of prime importance that the historical water transfers and water-sharing
agreements are studied to make inferences regarding future decisions. The first essay takes
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a step in this direction and empirically investigates the impact of the Owens Valley water
transfer on economic growth and the urban region. Back in the 1900s, the officials from
Los Angeles sought water from the Owens Valley located in Eastern California by buying
the agricultural lands (Libecap, 2004). We use Gross Domestic Product Per Capita (GDP
Per Capita) as the indicator of economic growth. A synthetic control method is employed
to show that the rise in the GDP Per Capita and Manufacturing Product Per Capita was
higher with the water transfer and apply a difference-in-differences analysis to corroborate
our results. The essay adds to the current literature by presenting empirical evidence on the
acceleration of economic growth through resource procurement. Such evidence could be
utilized while making water allocation decisions based on scientific analysis.
The second essay studies the impacts of the transfer on urban sprawl. We converted a
geo-spatial data set using the historical land use-land cover maps and overlaying the same
over the present Californian counties to compute the urban sprawl in our study period. We
apply difference-in-differences and synthetic control methods for our analysis. However,
given the sparse urban sprawl data in the pre-intervention period, we rely on difference-
in-differences analysis for causal interpretation, unlike the first essay. We include a few
robustness checks to validate our results. There have been a few studies relating water
resources and urban sprawl in other fields. (Aakuraju and Amerasinghe, 2011; Hatab et
al., 2019; Duias-Caraventas and Sanchez-Flores, 2011). This study extends the current
literature by including a case study of the first-ever water transfer in the United States.
The third essay evaluates the welfare impacts of water-sharing and the Bear River De-
velopment Project. The Bear River Development Project is seeking to develop water re-
sources in Cache County and Wasatch Front, and transfer water from Cache Valley to
Wasatch Front. We apply the Nash Bargaining theory to a general equilibrium model as-
certaining the social welfare from sharing water between Cache County and Wasatch Front.
We use Compensating Variation or willingness-to-pay as measures for social welfare. The
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study makes a contribution to the literature by applying a game-theoretic approach to wa-
ter allocation problems. We seek to develop a strategy that ensures that both the regions
involved obtain a positive net benefit from the water transfer. With the threat of increasing
water wars and conflicts, it is essential that such decisions are made on the basis of careful
analysis ensuring fairness and efficiency for all the individuals involved.
The remainder of the dissertation is organized as follows. Chapters 2, 3, and 4 describe
the three essays as explained in the introduction. Each essay includes a separate introduc-
tion and conclusions. In Chapter 5, we summarize the dissertation and discuss the possible
policy implications.
CHAPTER 2
REGIONAL WATER TRANSFER AND ECONOMIC GROWTH:
EVIDENCE FROM THE OWENS VALLEY WATER TRANSFER
2.1 Introduction
The literature has abundantly studied economic growth and natural resources under the
purview of how economic growth has affected environmental sustainability (Dinda, 2004;
Everett et al., 2010; Cherniwchan, 2012). However, studies have ignored that oft-times,
government officials and bureaucrats have procured natural resources to develop a town
into a metropolitan and even, a county. The Western US, particularly California is a classic
example of such a development where water procurement from various sources facilitated
economic growth.
Quinn (1968) points out two main assumptions that led to the emergence of water trans-
fers and water markets: one was that large surpluses of unexploited wealth existed in the
Western US, and two, public policy must encourage settlement and development in the
West by making land, minerals, and water resources available. The West exhausted the
unappropriated part of the naturally available water supplies at the turn of the century. The
solution, found by one of the oldest metropolitan cities in the United States, Los Angeles,
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was the long-distance importation of water from the Owens Valley (Park, 2017).
This essay investigates the first region to import water from outside the city limits ever:
Los Angeles. In the early 1900s, Los Angeles, a city in Southern California, sought water
from an arid Owens Valley in Eastern California. A map showing the location of the two
areas is given in Appendix 8.1. Los Angeles was a city developed despite the lack of all the
basic facilities on the prospects of the future rather than on actual demand (Kahrl, 2000).
The Owens Valley water supply was expected to be five times higher than the local supply
when it first arrived in Los Angeles. The arrival of Owens Valley water resulted in the
annexation of nearby areas by the city (Ostrom, 1950). Agriculture was given a higher
priority as a means of economic livelihood before the railroad gained popularity by the end
of the 19th century. Los Angeles always applied excess water to crop irrigation within the
city limits (Ostrom, 1950). By 1935, Los Angeles had acquired 95 percent of the water
from Owens Valley (Libecap, 2008).
The relevance of this historic occurrence resides in the fact that the Southern California
water demands have created controversy throughout the West since the first water transfer.
Moreover, the conflict has continued to the current period as the region is struggling to meet
its ever-rising water demands (Howitt et al., 2002). The procurement of natural resources
from outside where such resources are scarce is not just a historical phenomenon. Major
water wars, like the Nile river basin conflict in the world, are being fought between different
regions trying to fulfill their water demand from the same source (Mbote, 2007). Hence,
policies formalizing water transfers have become essential at higher levels like state or
country, alongside the county level. Furthermore, the focus in the literature related to
water transfers has primarily been the parties’ attitudes in the water market and welfare
implications, or the impact of such transfers on water use (Howitt et al., 2002; Barbier and
Chaudhary, 2013; Lund and Israel, 1995).
Although there is literature documenting the annexation of neighboring areas by Los
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Angeles due to water procurement beyond its city’s boundaries, the empirical studies to
evidence the same are non-existent (Kahrl, 2000; Ostrom, 1950). Typically, population
and development are considered as primary factors that lead to procurement of resources-
however, the part played by officials and bureaucrats to obtain these resources to promote
the economic growth of a region has not been tested empirically in the literature. Such an
investigation has become necessary given the increasing water conflicts in various parts of
the world.
This essay uses a comparative case study providing critical empirical evidence for the
effect of the water transfer on Los Angeles’ growth where the treatment and control groups
are defined based on the year of water transfer, i.e., 1920. We use synthetic control and
difference-in-differences methods to bring out the treatment effect of the Owens valley
water transfer facilitating the economic growth in Los Angeles. We include a placebo
test where the synthetic control method is applied to all the control units included in the
study. No treatment effect in these units reveals that the treatment effect in Los Angeles is
significant. The growth of Gross Domestic Product per Capita (GDP per capita) represents
economic growth in the study. The synthetic control results show that the economic growth
was higher in Los Angeles compared to other Californian counties with the water transfer
and are supported by the difference-in-differences analysis. These results indicate that the
procurement of natural resources facilitates economic growth in a region.
The essay is organized as follows. The second section briefly describes the background
of the study. The third section presents the data and empirical strategy. The fourth section




The nineteenth-century American West was made habitable as rural communities ad-
justed to the limitations of local water availability. Today, the search for water supply ex-
tends beyond the nearest river basin. The water transfer institutions highly impact the devel-
opment of an economy (Quinn, 1968; Brewer, 1965). A dry American West started trans-
forming from ranching, irrigated farming, and mining to urban growth, services, tourism,
and manufacturing industry (Colby, 1990), involving some of the earliest urban centers in
the United States. Kahrl (2000) mentions specifically for California: "More than gold and
oil, railroad and freeway construction, the film and aerospace industries, water distribution
has shaped the development of California’s cities."
Californian growth was characterized by an aspect of uniqueness, with cities like Los
Angeles being the pioneers of such development (Nash, 1972). Nash (1972) notes that
California has been ahead of other areas by one generation. A large influx of population and
industrial boom characterized the growth of California between 1900 and 1940. However,
despite being a coastal city without a port and lacking sewers and schools, factors like
advertisement and development based on future prospects rather than actual demand fed its
continuous growth. The first step to procure resources for such a development was between
1905 and 1935- when the efforts of William Mulholland and Fred Eaton led to the biggest
and the first-ever rural to urban water transfer in history: the Owens Valley water transfer.
The Owens Valley water transfer was highly controversial where Los Angeles was per-
ceived as a thief stealing water and robbing the agricultural economy of Owens Valley
(Libecap, 2004). The former secretary of the Interior, Ray Lyman Wilbur, once remarked,
"You didn’t bring these people here with railroad trains. Water brought them. You can have
all the salt oceans, the blue skies, and sunshine in this world, and you will all disappear
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unless you have water" (Ostrom, 1950)1. The prime issue that generated the controversy
was that the transfer had happened in a land market with high secrecy maintained around
it to prevent a price increase. Kahrl (2000) mentions that when questioned for bringing
in so much water, the officials exaggerated the demand of Los Angeles and even gave an
account of dire consequences that the city would be in if there was no water transfer. He
mentions that the water transfer derailed the agricultural potential that could surpass the
other agricultural economies such as Imperial, Sacramento, and San Joaquin valleys. It is
oft mentioned in the Owens valley literature that the agricultural lands were bought by the
officials secretly so that people could not oppose the acquisition in addition to preventing
price rise, which would finally lead to an end of irrigated agriculture in the valley (Kahrl,
2000; Libecap, 2004; Ostrom, 1950).
Libecap (2004) mentions that the negative publicity and citation of Owens Valley syn-
drome by various researchers, including the likes of Vincent Ostrom, provided a barrier
to future agriculture to urban water transfers. He mentions that the water transfer to Los
Angeles brought dramatic property gains from trade in Owens Valley. He states a counter-
factual scenario, where, if the transfer did not happen, the economic gains for the Owens
Valley would have been lesser than the gains from the transfer. He agrees that the dis-
proportionate share of the total gains from the Owens Valley water transfer went to Los
Angeles, given the nature of water demand and supply and a relatively inelastic demand
of the urban users contrary to the farmers’ elastic export supply in comparison (Libecap,
2008). The bitterness over being under-compensated lies in the fact that the value of water
to Los Angeles was difficult to ascertain at the time (Libecap, 2004; 2008).
Hence, it would not be an understatement to posit that the Owens Valley water trans-
fer calls for a crucial examination. Libecap (2004, 2008) has shown how an efficiency-
enhancing trade was tied up in distributional conflicts. However, this study inspects a much
1Libecap (2004, 2008) notes that the intensity of the debate on the water transfer, perceived as interfering
with natural resources, was to such an extent that a movie ’Chinatown’ was created around it.
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Our primary variable of interest is the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita, fol-
lowing the literature on economic growth where GDP has been commonly used to indicate
economic growth (Munir et al., 2020; Ruiz, 2017). We obtain the variables used in the
study from NHGIS IPUMS, the University of Minnesota, from 1850-1950 (Manson et al.,
2020). The main sectors contributing to the GDP during the study period were manufac-
turing and agriculture. Some data was also available in the other sectors apart from the two
mentioned above, as shown in Appendix Table 2.4.
One of the major issues with the data was that the counties increase from 27 to 58
during the study period. However, for identification, we need an equal number of counties
before and after the treatment period2. Some of the new counties, for instance, Orange was
wholly a part of one original county, i.e., Los Angeles. Few counties split from more than
one county; for instance, the Alpine county formed from parts of Amador, Calaveras, El
Dorado, Mono, and Tuolumne counties. Nine counties were created by split-then-merge,
which had to be dropped from the analysis.
2We include the original 27 counties for the current analysis.
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Table 2.1
County details over the decades
Year Total number of counties Number of counties that split Number of counties that split and merge
1850 27
1860 43 14 2
1870 50 16 7
1880 52 18 8
1890 54 20 8
1900 57 22 9
1910 58 23 9
Table 2.1 gives a brief description of changes in the number of counties during the
study period. There are no counties that merge per se unless they split from two or more
counties, for example, the Alpine county, which formed from parts of five other counties.
All the 27 counties were available to be included whether they split merge or not. There
are 14 counties that neither split nor merged.
As mentioned earlier, the value of the agricultural product and the value of the manu-
facturing product are the main contributing sectors to calculate the GDP. Appendix Table
2.5 consists of disaggregated variables used to calculate the agricultural value of the prod-
uct. However, the variable definition for the Value of Agricultural Product per Capita in
1930 was slightly different. We selected the variables in 1930, which was closest to the
definitions for Agricultural Product per capita in the other years. Another pressing concern
in the data was that the value of manufacturing product was missing in 1910 and 1950,
which poses a serious challenge.
Data scientists typically deal with the missingness of data by removing all the missing
data points and the associated observations- formally called a listwise deletion. Pepinsky
(2018) mentions that this process is inefficient and could be biased when the probability that
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an observation is missing is related to its true value. Moreover, McNeish (2017) comments
that although the method is more appealing due to the less intensive manner for handling
missing values, there is a trade-off between convenience and less desirable performance
with small samples. Since we also have a small sample in this study, a multiple imputation
method is more reasonable than dropping the missing observations.
Multiple imputations have been widely used for dealing with missing data (Rubin,
1987; Rubin, 1996; Schafer, 1997; Barnard and Meng, 1999; Reiter and Raghunathan,
2007; Harel and Zhou, 2007, Akande et al., 2017). Most analysts adopt two methods: Joint
Modeling (JM) and Fully Conditional Specification (FCS) (Buuren, 2007; Akande et al.,
2017). The JM strategy is appealing since it accords with the theory in Rubin (1987)3.
One of the most popular Joint Modeling approaches is expectation-maximization with
bootstrapping algorithm. The expectation-maximization algorithm has been used in the
literature for a long time (Bar-Hen, 2002). The literature involving the use of longitudinal
and panel data has implemented the Amelia II package in R (Honaker et al., 2011), given
its ease of use and generating results similar to Monte Carlo approaches (Honaker et al.,
2011).
The enhancements to the newly developed algorithm work well with panel data in po-
litical science and macroeconomic fields (Honaker and King, 2010; Yang et al., 2015).
Yang et al. (2015) used the package to impute 27 variables for their study. Moreover,
our dataset requires an imputation method that can control for both cross-sectional and
time components. Following the preceding imputation literature, we adopt the expectation-
maximization with bootstrapping algorithm to impute missing data4. As a robustness check
3The most popular FCS approach is known as Multiple Imputation by Chained Equations (MICE)
(Akande et al., 2017). This approach is still an open research area for multilevel or longitudinal data. Hence,
it suffers from a significant drawback for implementation in our study.
4We rely on the literature since limited studies have used imputation for panel data; one of the examples
of such studies is mentioned in the text.
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measure, we also impute the data using other methods5. We also include diagnostics com-
paring the original and imputed dataset in Appendix Figure 2.9.
Table 2.2 shows descriptive statistics for all the variables.
Table 2.2
Descriptive Statistics
Statistic N Mean St. Dev. Min Pctl(25) Pctl(75) Max
Gross Domestic Product per capita 270 417.215 529.873 18.674 161.548 502.873 5,418.325
Manufacturing Product per Capita 270 256.689 497.709 0.000 43.182 295.997 5,231.926
Agricultural Product per Capita 270 160.526 181.137 3.877 55.667 186.414 1,308.076
Percentage of Urban Population 243 29.333 28.440 0.000 0.000 49.113 98.391
Number of farms under 10 acres per capita 243 0.004 0.005 0.000 0.002 0.006 0.034
Number of farms from 10 to 49 acres per capita 243 0.013 0.011 0.0001 0.006 0.017 0.061
Number of farms from 50 to 99 acres per capita 243 0.007 0.005 0.0001 0.004 0.010 0.030
Number of farms under 100 acres per capita 243 0.025 0.017 0.001 0.013 0.034 0.087
Number of farms from 100 to 999 per capita 243 0.028 0.023 0.0001 0.010 0.042 0.121
Number of farms more than 1000 per capita 243 0.004 0.004 0.000 0.001 0.005 0.023
Number of farms per capita 243 0.058 0.031 0.001 0.033 0.080 0.155
Wages paid per person employed 186 2,965.844 8,270.749 150.664 505.847 1,370.432 88,250.000
Persons employed per capita 242 0.034 0.035 0.000 0.008 0.049 0.249
Value of farm property per capita 243 829.785 791.121 9.074 289.870 1,113.554 5,079.433
Value of land and buildings per capita 108 1,125.589 864.082 28.657 538.106 1,447.289 4,494.966
The main observations from the table are the differences between the largest values and
3rd quartiles of GDP per capita, Manufacturing Product per capita, Agricultural Product
per capita, and Wages per person employed. The difference between these values is quite
high, indicating the discrepancy in economic growth among various Californian counties.
Moreover, the standard deviation and means are much higher in GDP per capita and Manu-
facturing Product per capita compared to Agricultural Product per capita. This observation
5Kalman Smoothing, Simple Weighted Moving Average, Exponential Moving Average, Linear Interpo-
lation, Linear Weighted Moving Average, Random Sample, Spline Interpolation and Stine Interpolation in
Appendix 2.7.3
13
is not surprising as urbanization was taking place (however, at different rates) in the state.
The difference in the mean, 3rd quartile, and the maximum value in percentage of urban
population is also very high, indicating urbanization in only a few counties in California.
The left panel of figure 2.1 shows the plot of GDP per capita for all the counties and
the Value of Manufacturing Product Per Capita on the right panel. The blue line repre-
sents Los Angeles, and the gray lines represent the control counties. The dashed line in
between marks the treatment year and divides the graph into pre and post-treatment pe-
riods. As we can observe, the two variables started increasing before the treatment year,
and the GDP per capita slightly dropped after 1930. Moreover, we observe peaks in other
counties. These observations could be a result of factors like capital, labor, etc. Hence, we
use a non-parametric method, reducing the assumptions about the population distribution,
i.e., synthetic control, to disentangle the impact of water transfer on economic growth and
corroborate our results using the difference-in-differences analysis.
Figure 2.1












































































I. Synthetic Control Method
The econometric methodology adopted in this study draws on the precedent of analysis
developed for studying the effect of an intervention on an outcome of interest. We use
a synthetic control analysis developed by Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003) to estimate the
effect of water transfer from Los Angeles to Owens valley in 1920 on economic growth.
The basic intuition behind the method is to construct a ’synthetic control unit’ based on a
weighted combination of the available control units (in the pre-intervention period), which
closely imitates the actual treatment unit. The change in the outcome of interest is then
observed in the counterfactual treatment unit and compared with the actual treatment unit.
The synthetic control method is an extension of the difference-in-differences method.
Many empirical researchers believe that the weighted control unit system which the method
relies on is better than the traditional difference-in-differences method where the counties
are given an equal weight assuming that they closely match the treatment unit in most of
its attributes (Akhundjanov and Jakus, 2019; Abadie and Gardeazabal, 2003).
Akhundjanov and Jakus (2019) describe synthetic control as a two-step methodology;
where the first step involves computing the unit weights, i.e., the weights assigned to the
control units based on their closeness to the treatment unit in terms of measurable attributes
and the co-variate weights, i.e., the weights assigned to the co-variates based on their power
to the predict the outcome variable. Then, a synthetic control unit is constructed using the
unit weights. An ideal synthetic control unit would imitate the treatment unit very closely
in the pre-treatment period. The next step deals with the post-treatment time frame where
the discrepancy between the post-intervention outcome of the synthetic control unit (which
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is assumed to represent what would have happened if there was no intervention) and the
treatment unit reveals the treatment effect.
The theoretical properties of the synthetic control method are discussed by Abadie et al.
(2010), Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003), and Akhundjanov and Jakus (2019). We explain
these properties using an example of three counties and 5 time periods for simplicity. As-
sume i=1 is our treatment unit and i>1 for the other 2 counties observed for t=1,...,5. Hence,
the other units serve as the potential control. Also, assume that water transfer happens at
the time period 3.
Let Y NIit be the outcome variable, i.e., outcome variable for the three counties in periods
1, 2, and 3 when the intervention has not taken place and Y Iit be the outcome variable for
unit i=1 in period t if the unit i=1 in the post-intervention period, i.e. t>3. Hence, for the
pre-intervention period, Y Iit = Y
NI
it would be satisfied for all i=1,2,3 and t=1,2,3. Assume
Γit = Y Iit −Y NIit is the treatment effect from intervention. However, Y NI1t is not observable
for t > 3, i.e. outcome for the unit i=1 when there is no intervention. Hence, the synthetic
control unit aims at representing the actual treatment unit as closely as possible and replace
Y NI1t .
The idea presented above can be validated as follows. Consider Zi as a vector of ob-
served explanatory variables of the GDP for the pre-intervention period. Also, assume
Y Ki = ∑
2
t=1 ktYit is a linear combination of pre-intervention outcomes for unit i where
K = (k1,k2,k3)′ is a set of weights for the explanatory variables in pre-treatment period.
These linear combinations are used to control for the effect of unobservable common con-
founders that vary with time (Abadie et al., 2010; Akhundjanov and Jakus, 2019).
Let W =(w2,w3)′ be the vector of weights that is assigned to unexposed units in the pre-
intervention period where wi ≥ 0 for i = 2,3 and w2 +w3 = 1. Different W-vector values




































Hence, W ∗ produces a weighted average of the control units in a way that closely im-
itates the actual treatment unit. Abadie et al. (2010) propose to select the W ∗ = W (V )
such that it minimizes the overall discrepancy between the characteristics of the synthetic
control unit and the actual treatment unit in the pre-treatment period. The synthetic control
unit can be obtained as:








3t for t > T0
And finally, the estimator of the treatment effect is:
α̂1t = Y I1t− Ŷ NI1t for t > 3
This method can be extended to any number of individual units and time periods. A
generalized form of the synthetic control unit would then be:






it for t > t0
such that t0 is the time of intervention and 2,....N+1 are control units.
Inferences
The inferential techniques undertaken in the current study are akin to Abadie et al.
(2010). They suggest, as in permutation tests, applying the synthetic control method to
every possible control in the sample. This would allow researchers to assess whether the
effect estimated for the region affected by the intervention is large relative to the effect
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estimated for a region chosen at random. This inferential exercise is said to be exact in the
sense that, regardless of comparison regions, time periods, and data, it would always be
possible to calculate the exact distribution of the estimated effect of the placebo interven-
tions. The placebo interventions refer to an assumption that the water transfer happened
in the control counties and the synthetic control analysis is performed on these counties.
Since there was no such transfer, the expected result in this analysis is no treatment effect.
The inferential method tries to assess whether the treatment effect is large in comparison to
the distribution of the effects estimated for the regions not exposed to the intervention.
Abadie et al. (2010) mention that this approach to drawing an inference in compara-
tive case studies is similar to recent developments in inferential methods for difference-in-
differences models (Wooldridge, 2003; Athey and Imbens, 2006; Donald and Lang, 2007).
One of the main drawbacks of using a non-parametric method like Synthetic Con-
trol analysis is that there are no tests for statistical significance. Hence, we revert to a
difference-in-differences analysis showing the significance and sensitivity of our results.
II. Difference-in-differences
A difference-in-differences method with two-way fixed effects and the individual effect
is employed to provide statistical evidence on the direction and significance of the synthetic
control results. We divide the duration of the study into two periods based on the year that
the water transfer from Owens Valley to Los Angeles took place, i.e., 1920. Hence, 1850-
1920 becomes the pre-intervention period and 1930-1950 is the post-intervention period.
To study the effect of water transfer from Owens valley on the economic growth of Los
Angeles, we estimate the equations as given below.
Two way fixed-effects:
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Yit = αitI(DitTit)+X ′itβ +λt +νi +ηit
Individual effects:
Yit = αitI(DitTit)+X ′itβ +νi +ηit
Yit is the observed outcome, i.e. the GDP per capita for county i and year t and Xit is the
set of explanatory variables. Dit is the county dummy variable that equals 1, if i represents
the treatment unit, i.e. Los Angeles and 0, for all other counties in California. Tit is a
dummy variable for the pre and the post-treatment period, if t belongs to the pre-treatment
period, i.e., t ≤ 1920, Tit = 0 and if t belongs to the post-treatment period, i.e. t > 1920,
Tit = 1, I(.) represents the interaction between the time and county dummy, λt is the time
effect, νi is the individual effect and ηit is the time-variant error term.
The parameter of interest is αit , i.e., the coefficient of the interaction term between the
pre and post-intervention dummy and the county dummy variables. It captures the water
transfer through the impact of the characteristics of the treated county, LA, in the post-
intervention period.
2.4 Results and Discussion
This section includes the results for the synthetic control method and the difference-
in-differences analysis. 12 out of a total of 27 values in 1850 were zeroes for the primary
dependent variable (GDP per capita). Hence, the year 1850 had to be dropped from the
study.
I. Synthetic control Results
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For the synthetic control analyses, year had to be converted to Period since we use decen-
nial data. Hence period 2 represents the year 1860, period 3 represents the year 1870, and
so on. Period 8 represents the treatment year, i.e., 1920. We excluded highly correlated pre-
dictors like Total Annual Agricultural Wages per Capita, Total capital invested per capita,
etc. We summarize the county weights in Appendix Table 2.7.
Figure 2.2
Time plot (Left Panel) and falsification test (Right Panel) for GDP per capita


































































0 Los Angeles County
Control Counties
Appendix Table 2.8 describes the predictors used for this analysis. We show the time
path of GDP per capita and a falsification test in Figure 2.2. The left panel of Figure 2.2
represents the time plot with a gray line anchored at period 8 (i.e. year 1920) to distinguish
between the pre and post-treatment period. The synthetic Los Angeles follows the actual
Los Angeles county very closely in the pre-treatment period; hence we may conclude that
it’s a good estimator of the actual Los Angeles. The time plot shows a significant increase
after the year 1920 (time period 8), which confirms the hypothesis that the water transfer
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resulted in a higher GDP per capita than would have been without the water transfer. As
observed from the earlier sections, there is evidence from the literature that the aim for the
water transfer was to influence an even higher economic growth in the city, to the extent
that it would annex all the nearby areas and develop into a county (Kahrl, 2000).
The right side of Figure 2.2 shows the falsification analysis. The black solid line repre-
sents the gap, i.e., the actual Los Angeles minus the synthetic Los Angeles county, and the
gray lines show the gap for the placebo tests applied to the 26 remaining counties. It shows
that the growth in GDP per capita seems to be significant. To investigate further, we break
down the GDP per Capita into its main components, i.e., Manufacturing Product per Capita
and Agricultural Product per Capita, and perform a synthetic control analysis on both the
components separately.
A. Value of Manufacturing output as the dependent variable
We perform a synthetic control analysis on the Manufacturing product per Capita. We
provide a summary of the predictors used in this analysis in Appendix Table 2.9.
Figure 2.3 shows the time plot and a falsification test for the Value of Manufacturing
Product per Capita. From the left panel, we observe that the synthetic unit follows the
actual Los Angeles in the pre-treatment period closely showing that it is a good estimator
of the latter. In the post-treatment period, the manufacturing product of actual Los Angeles
seems to be significantly higher, similar to the analysis with the GDP per capita. Even the
falsification test shows that the increase in Manufacturing Product per Capita is likely to




Time plot (Left Panel) and falsification test (Right Panel) for Manufacturing Product per Capita



































































































B. Value of Agricultural output as the dependent variable
Next, we perform the synthetic control analysis with Agricultural Product per Capita. Ap-
pendix Table 2.10 demonstrates the predictors used for the analysis. Figure 2.4 exhibits the
time plot and a falsification analysis for the same.
The left side of figure 2.4 shows that the synthetic Los Angeles follows the actual Los
Angeles county quite closely in the pre-treatment period, which shows that the synthetic
Los Angeles county is a good predictor of the actual Los Angeles County. In the post-
treatment period, the Agricultural product per Capita for Los Angeles County falls below
its synthetic counterpart. Hence, it shows a negative treatment effect. The falsification
analysis displayed on the right side of figure 2.4 substantiates this result.
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Figure 2.4
Path plot (Left Panel) and falsification test (Right Panel) for Agricultural Product per Capita



























































































0 Los Angeles county
Control Counties
The synthetic control analyses with the three dependent variables help us to make con-
clusions regarding the water transfer. The intervention being the water transfer from agri-
culture to urban led to a much higher increase in GDP per capita (primarily from the Man-
ufacturing product per capita), as would have been without the water transfer and a decline
in Agricultural Product per Capita. Table 2.3 shows the average discrepancy in the de-
pendent variable trends between Los Angeles County and its synthetic counterpart. We
observe large differences in GDP per capita and Manufacturing per capita, whereas there
is a relatively small negative difference in Agricultural Product per capita.
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Table 2.3
Summary of SC results
Variable Gap (in $) Percent
GDP per capita 178.2833 49.19766
Manufacturing Product per capita 132.3004 36.80267
Agricultural Product per capita -113.83 -13.9228
Note. "Gap" is Per capita outcome variable in a treated unit - Per capita outcome
variable in a synthetic control unit in dollars. We calculate "Percent" by dividing
"Gap" by per capita outcome variable and then multiplying this value by 100.
These values are averaged over the post-treatment period.
Figures 2.2 and 2.3 show a considerable difference in trajectories of the synthetic and
actual Los Angeles counties. The synthetic unit experiences a decline in Manufacturing
Product per capita (and hence, GDP per capita) immediately after the treatment year. On
the other hand, both the variables increase in the actual Los Angeles county indicating that
water transfer evaded the decline after 1920. However, the two figures show that the slopes
of the trajectories are similar for the actual and synthetic Los Angeles units in the later
periods, indicating a larger short-term effect of the transfer. As noted in previous sections,
the water transfer is the main reason for the growth of Los Angeles County being cited as
unique (Nash, 1972).
One of the drawbacks of the synthetic control analysis is that it does not give any para-
metric test for statistical significance. Hence, we include a difference-in-differences below
for each of the dependent variables to compare our results from a non-parametric method
to a parametric method.
II. Difference-in-Differences Results
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We employ the difference-in-differences technique using two fixed effects specifications to
cross-validate our synthetic control analyses. However, given the lack of a common trend
assumption, the estimates should be interpreted with caution.
Figure 2.5 describes the results with GDP per capita as the dependent variable. We use
two specifications, including both time and county fixed effects in the left panel and time
fixed effects in the right panel 6. The key objective behind this analysis is to observe the
changes in treatment effects with different groups of predictors. The black dots represent
the GDP per capita and the lines represent confidence intervals. We can test the significance
of the variables by observing the closeness of confidence intervals (black lines) to the zero
line. We can observe that the treatment effect comes out to be positive and statistically
significant in most of the specifications. Some of the specifications are significant at the
10 percent level. Different specifications are provided for each farm variable since they
are highly correlated. The results show that Los Angeles County experienced substantial
economic growth in the post-treatment period.
6Detailed tabular results specifying each model are included in Table 2.11, Appendix 2.7.5
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Figure 2.5
Scatter plot of two-ways (Left Panel) and individual fixed effects (Right Panel) for Gross Domestic





























Next, we describe the results when the dependent variable is Manufacturing Product
per Capita in figure 2.6. For this analysis, we include the predictors that are only related to
the manufacturing sector 7. Similar to the case of GDP per capita, we observe a consistent
positive treatment effect in most of the specifications. Thus, Los Angeles County experi-
enced high growth in the Manufacturing sector post the water transfer. However, one of the
shortcomings in this analysis is using few predictors related to the manufacturing sector.
7Detailed tabular results specifying each model are included in Table 2.11, Appendix 2.7.5
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Figure 2.6
Plot of two-ways (Left Panel) and individual fixed effects (Right Panel) for Manufacturing Product




























Figure 2.7 summarizes the difference-in-differences results with Agricultural Product
per Capita as the dependent variable 8. We observe a consistent negative sign for the treat-
ment effect indicating a decline in Agricultural Product per Capita post the water transfer
in Los Angeles County. The predictors with the number of farms (total and disaggregated
by acreage) are each added separately in different specifications since they are correlated
with each other.
8Detailed tabular results specifying each model are included in Table 2.12, Appendix 2.7.5
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Figure 2.7
Plot of two-ways (Left Panel) and individual fixed effects (Right Panel) for Agricultural Product per




























We observe that the three difference-in-differences analyses conform to the synthetic
control method results. However, we would have to revert to the synthetic control results
given the lack of evidence for the common-trend assumption for causal inference, hence,
the estimates should be interpreted with caution. Combining the DID estimates with SC
results, we show the plausibility of a positive and statistically significant treatment effect on
GDP per capita and Manufacturing Product per capita as well as a negative and statistically
significant impact on agricultural product per capita. Thus, it would be safe to conclude that
the Owens Valley water transfer led to a shift in Los Angeles from an agricultural economy
to an urban economy, in addition to causing substantial growth in Los Angeles.
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2.5 Conclusion
The Owens Valley water transfer was the first-ever and one of the most controversial
attempts at effectuating the economic growth of a region. Prominent researchers from dif-
ferent backgrounds have painted a negative picture for the Owens Valley, including Kahrl
(2000), an avid Owens Valley historian. The negativity was built around the premise that
Los Angeles’ officials procured water more than actual demand (Kahrl, 2000). This por-
trayal has shaped the current aversion towards agriculture to urban water transfer, as ob-
served by Libecap (2004, 2008), in a detailed analysis of the Owens Valley water transfer.
This essay explores the impact of Owens Valley water transfer on GDP per capita bro-
ken into Manufacturing Product per Capita and Agricultural Product per Capita to make
conclusions regarding economic growth post the transfer. We include a difference-in-
differences method to support our synthetic control results and provide a parametric test
of significance. We observe that the agricultural product per capita is lower when the wa-
ter transfer takes place. The synthetic control results also show an increase in GDP per
capita (from Manufacturing) in the presence of the water transfer. This result is substanti-
ated using difference-in-differences. However, the increase in Manufacturing Product per
capita was higher than the decline in Agricultural Product per Capita. The synthetic con-
trol method is more convincing over difference-in-differences since it allows weighing the
counties based on the similarity between the control units and the actual treatment unit.
Hence, we derive our causal inference from the synthetic control method and support them
using difference-in-differences.
This essay is a novel attempt to study the effect of a water transfer on economic growth,
disentangling the impacts on its two main contributing sectors, i.e. agricultural and manu-
facturing. The Owens Valley case was a pioneer for water transfers, not only in the Western
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US but probably in the world, as per my knowledge. The manner in which it took place
and the controversy it created established the opinion for future water transfers. Chong
and Sunding (2006) mention four arguments 9 against water trading central to research and
debate. Few of these perceptions formed post the Owens Valley water transfer (Chong and
Sunding, 2006). Further, Libecap (2004) comments on the current conception of rural-to-
urban water transfers being highly impacted by the Owens Valley experience. We con-
tribute to the literature by providing empirical evidence regarding the impact of a water
transfer on economic growth. Although it seems intuitive, the rising water conflicts neces-
sitate empirical investigation for water allocation and its impacts on economic growth.
Moreover, the conflict between Owens Valley and Los Angeles never ended; it has
continued until the present. The water choices made in the past have had significant con-
sequences, which must be studied to inform policy for future decisions regarding the two
areas. The history of Los Angeles has been repeated in many parts of the world10, even
with institutionalizations for water transfers existing in developed countries, like Australia
and some parts of the United States. Future research could extend this study by comparing
the impacts of a water transfer on the economic growth in both water-exporting and import-
ing regions to ensure fair and efficient water allocation. In conclusion, the story of Owens
Valley water transfer might have been based on lobbying by the then officials; however, the
water transfer did have immediate positive impacts; a scientific basis for water allocation
decisions is essential to avoid such conflicts in the future.
9The four arguments they mention are: 1) Water transfer means reallocation from agriculture-to-urban
uses. 2) Transfers result in large economic losses for the areas of origin 3) Interbasin trade should be prohib-
ited because of large hydrologic effects 4) Water is a public good and should not be subject to market forces.
The Owens Valley water transfer resulted in the first two perceptions. (Chong and Sunding, 2006)
10Some examples of such conflicts include the Cauvery water conflict, Israel-Palestine water conflict, Con-
flicts in the Middle East, and MENA region. (Ajami, 2014)
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Location map of California: The green dot shows the location of the Owens Valley, the blue area
shows the Inyo county where the river is located and the yellow area shows the Los Angeles county
which imported the water from the Owens valley.
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2.7.2 Disaggregated Dependent variables
Table 2.4
Disaggregated Gross Domestic Product
1900 Value of animals sold live and slaughtered
Value of dairy products
Value of poultry
Value of Bees
Value of Miscellaneous products: Hemp, Castor Bean, For-
est Products, Vegetables, Peppermint oil, willows
Value of Fruit and nut production
1910 Dairy products
Value of poultry and eggs produced
Value of Honey and Wax produced
Value of wool and mohair produced
1920 Value of poultry
Value of beehives
Receipts from sale of dairy products
Reciepts from sale of eggs and chicken
1930 Sum of dairy products
Total value of fleece
Total value of poultry
Total value of chicken and egg
Total honey produced
Note. In other years, only the value of agricultural product
and the value of manufacturing were available.
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Table 2.5
Disaggregated components of the value of agricultural output
Year Used Variables Available variables Comparison
1850 Estimated value of crop,
orchard and market garden
products
Value of Non- Field product
groups
Estimated value of home
manufactures and animals
slaughtered
Value of each crop calculated
as price*quantity
Similar
1860 Estimated value of crop,
orchard and market garden
products
Value of Non- Field product
groups
Estimated value of home
manufactures and animals
slaughtered
Value of each crop calculated
as price*quantity
similar
1870 Estimated Value of farm pro-
ductions
1880 Estimated value of all farm
products
1890 Estimated value of all farm
products
1900 Farm products not fed to live-
stock
1910 Value of all crops Value of crops: Cereals, other
gains and seeds, hay and for-
age, vegetables, fruit and nut
and all other crops
exactly same
37
1920 Value of crops: Cereals, other
gains and seeds, hay and for-
age, vegetables, fruit and nut
and all other crops (two from
diff sets)
Value of all crops (two from
diff sets)
exactly same
1930 Value of agricultural prod-
ucts: cereals, hay and for-
age, other grains and seeds,
vegetables, fruits and nuts, all
other field crops, garden veg-
etables and forest products
Total Value of crops: cereals,
other grains and seeds, hay
and forage, vegetables, fruits
and nuts, other field crops
All crops harvested
Total farm products sold,
traded or used by value
Total value of field and or-
chard crops, vegetables and
farm gardens by crop
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1940 Value of all crops Value of crops : cereals,
corn, wheat, hay and forage,
other grains and seed, cotton
and cottonseed, tobacco, irish
and sweet potatoes, vegeta-




Total value of field and or-
chard crops, vegetables and
farm garden crops
1950 Value of farm products
2.7.3 Diagnostics for imputation method
In this section, we show a few diagnostic checks for our imputation method. The left
panel of figure 2.9 shows a comparison between the density of the observed and imputed
values. The mean imputations do have some values which are higher than the observed
values but that is because we are imputing the last year where increased value was observed
for other variables in the last year as well. The right panel shows the over-imputation graph.
The dots represent the mean imputations and the lines represent the confidence intervals.
Since most of the confidence intervals contain the 45-degree line, it means that the true
observed values fall within this range (Honaker et al., 2011).
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Figure 2.9
Imputation Diagnostics: The left side of the figure shows a density plot of the observed values
versus imputed values. The right side of the figure shows an overimputation graph which compares
the observed and imputed values with a 45 degree line.
To compare expectation-maximization (Amelia) with other methods, we use time series
imputation methods like Kalman smoothing, moving average, and interpolation to ensure
that it generates model fit measures that are either similar or better than the time series
methods. A good model fit would have a low value of the difference between the fit gener-
ated using the imputed dataset and that generated by the actual dataset. Table 2.6 provides
these measures for five counties and shows that the expectation-maximization method gen-
erates reasonable model fit measures. We did not apply the time series methods further to
other counties given that it is cumbersome and the expectation-maximization method gives
































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Predictors used for SC with GDP per capita
Predictors Treated Synthetic Sample Mean
Percentage of Urban Population 46.33 39.66 21.05
Percentage of Rural Population 21.10 36.76 63.09
Value of land and buildings per capita 583.09 744.70 1259.56
Wages paid per person employed 3339.52 3274.05 3597.00
Persons employed per capita 0.03 0.03 0.03
Total capital invested per capita 15497.85 22702.17 23744.69
Capital invested in plant land per capita 8.43 20.25 20.47
Capital invested in buildings per capita 8.24 10.55 13.41
Capital invested in machinery per capita 22.49 30.97 30.61
Capital invested in live assets per capita 25.87 35.45 29.62
Capital invested in cash and sundries per capita 33.38 35.24 41.21
Value of farm property per capita 498.09 503.44 856.98
Number of farms under 10 acres per capita 0.00 0.00 0.00
Number of farms 10-49 acres per capita 0.02 0.01 0.01
Number of farms 50-99acres per capita 0.01 0.01 0.01
Number of farms 100-999acres per capita 0.01 0.02 0.04
Total Annual Agricultural Wages Paid Per Capita 12.59 12.88 27.24
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Table 2.9
Predictors used for SC with Manufacturing Product per Capita
Predictors Treated Synthetic Sample Mean
Percentage of Urban Population 46.33 32.90 21.05
Percentage of Rural Population 21.10 45.18 63.09
Wages paid per person employed 3339.52 2550.14 3597.00
Capital invested in plant land per capita 8.43 15.08 20.47
Capital invested in buildings per capita 8.24 10.57 13.41
Capital invested in machinery per capita 22.49 21.13 30.61
Capital invested in live assets per capita 25.87 27.18 29.62
Capital invested in cash and sundries per capita 33.38 44.37 41.21
Value of farm property per capita 498.09 715.33 856.98
Number of total farms per capita 0.04 0.06 0.06
Number of farms under 10 acres per capita 0.00 0.01 0.00
Number of farms 10-49 acres per capita 0.02 0.02 0.01
Number of farms 50-99 acres per capita 0.01 0.01 0.01
Number of farms 100-999 acres per capita 0.01 0.03 0.04
Number of farms more than 1000 acres per capita 0.00 0.00 0.00
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Table 2.10
Predictors used for SC with Agricultural Product per Capita
Predictors Treated Synthetic Sample Mean
Percentage of Urban Population 46.33 26.57 21.05
Percentage of Rural Population 21.10 59.29 63.09
Value of land and buildings per capita 583.09 604.56 1259.56
Wages paid per person employed 3339.52 3337.52 3597.00
Persons employed per capita 0.03 0.03 0.03
Total capital invested per capita 15497.85 15504.65 23744.69
Capital invested in plant land per capita 8.43 8.96 20.47
Capital invested in buildings per capita 8.24 8.42 13.41
Capital invested in machinery per capita 22.49 22.22 30.61
Capital invested in live assets per capita 25.87 26.25 29.62
Capital invested in cash and sundries per capita 33.38 33.25 41.21
Value of farm property per capita 498.09 421.89 856.98
Number of farms under 10 acres per capita 0.00 0.00 0.00
1 Number of farms 10-49 acres per capita 0.02 0.01 0.01
Number of farms 100-999 acres per capita 0.01 0.03 0.04























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Dependent variable as Manufacturing Product per capita.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Los Angeles Dummy*Year Dummy 19.528∗ 80.052 83.936∗∗ 35.650 83.919∗∗ 39.219∗ 90.627∗ 90.627∗
(11.523) (58.034) (39.293) (22.177) (38.910) (20.397) (50.745) (50.745)
Percentage of Urban Population 0.916 3.058 13.660 13.660
(5.099) (4.806) (17.979) (17.979)
Value of land and buildings per capita −0.081 −0.394 0.006 0.143 0.004 0.124 −0.301∗ −0.301∗
(0.073) (0.259) (0.051) (0.105) (0.047) (0.097) (0.162) (0.162)
Persons employed per capita 9,484.456∗∗ 12,046.800∗∗ 9,467.018∗∗ 11,824.290∗∗
(4,061.322) (5,778.416) (4,058.648) (5,799.352)
Year FE Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No
County and Year FE No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 108 108 81 81 81 81 108 108
R2 0.006 0.065 0.607 0.553 0.606 0.547 0.090 0.090
Adjusted R2 −0.347 −0.317 0.371 0.254 0.382 0.261 −0.299 −0.299
F Statistic 0.231 (df = 2; 79) 2.623∗ (df = 2; 76) 19.277∗∗∗ (df = 4; 50) 14.821∗∗∗ (df = 4; 48) 26.173∗∗∗ (df = 3; 51) 19.762∗∗∗ (df = 3; 49) 2.463∗ (df = 3; 75) 2.463∗ (df = 3; 75)

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































URBAN SPRAWL IN LOS ANGELES AND THE ROLE OF OWENS
VALLEY WATER TRANSFER
3.1 Introduction
The developed world experienced urbanization as early as the 20th and 21st centuries
as a result of rapid industrialization taking place at the time (Zhang, 2016). Zhang (2016)
mentions that the population in urban cities rose from a mere 5 percent in 1800 to 50
percent by the 1920s. Rapid urbanization has had immense impacts on environmental,
social, and political factors. On the one hand, it leads to an improvement in economic
growth and living standards; and on the other hand, it leads to increased pressure on natural
resources and land space (Wilby and Perry, 2006; Karthiyayini et al., 2016). Moreover, the
phenomenon of large urban areas taking up most of the land area available termed urban
sprawl (Oueslati et al., 2015) started appearing in the early to the mid-nineteenth century
in the developed world.
The term Urban Sprawl has been mentioned to take various forms- first, which involves
low-density residential developments that give rise to business activities including manu-
facturing, and second, where even individual houses replace rural landscapes (Nechyba and
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Walsh, 2004). Neychba and Walsh (2004) mention that 5% of the population lived in urban
areas in 1790, a figure that tripled by 1850 and had surpassed 50% in 1920. We use the
term urban sprawl following Neychba and Walsh (2004). Urban sprawl is considered to
be a more serious issue as it involves increased travel time and costs, lack of availability
of resources, and high population pressure (Aithal et al., 2017). The literature related to
urban sprawl in terms of water resources has focused on the water stress faced by the rural
and peri-urban areas for the water used in the agricultural sector due to the competition
over freshwater resources from urban areas for domestic use (Aakuraju and Amerasinghe,
2011). Apart from this, the literature has also focused on water rights acquisitions by cities
to expand their water supply (Dias-Caraventas and Sanchez-Flores, 2011; Hatab et al.,
2019). Procurement of natural resources for the expansion of growing urban centers has
become common in many parts of the world, and yet, there is little evidence of urbanization
or urban sprawl as a result of obtaining additional resources.
This essay is an attempt to shed light on the causal relationship between water resources
and urban sprawl; an increase in resources is often the reason for a town to transform into
a metropolitan city. Back in the 1900s, the controversial Owens Valley transfer where all
the sympathy went to the farmers from whom the lands and the water rights tied to them
were secretively bought by the Los Angeles officials. This water transfer took place by
exaggerating the city’s requirements for water, where the ultimate objective was to annex
the surrounding areas and build Los Angeles into a county (Kahrl, 2000). We show that
water transfer played an important role in urban sprawl through a comparative case study
using the synthetic control and difference-in-differences method.
The essay is organized as follows. The next section includes a brief literature review.
The third section consists of the empirical analysis describing the data, the empirical strat-
egy, and the results along with a few robustness checks. In the last section, we discuss and
conclude the results from our analysis.
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3.2 Background
I. Los Angeles Zoning policies
Zoning was flexible during the 1950s boom era where 60 percent of the land allowed all
types of residential buildings (Vallianatos and Brozen, 2019). Whittemore (2012) describes
the goal of Los Angeles’ officials to zone the arterials for multi-family use, restrict the
commercial uses located in clusters at the intersections, and reserve the interior streets
for single-family residences and public facilities. This was visualized as an economically
stable and attractive land-use division. However, this seemed to be a strenuous task as
a lot of explanation regarding the scope and components of zoning was required for the
discontented property owners. The popular demand led to communities becoming zoned
for more intensive uses than what was originally envisioned during the post-war years.
The long-term vision for Los Angeles planning included preserving agricultural land for
profitable uses and containing urbanization in concentrated areas. However, a large number
of property owners advocated for expanding the urban land. By the mid-1950s, rezoning
to non-agricultural uses took place without referring to a proper plan (Whittemore, 2012).
II. Review of the urban sprawl literature
’Urban Sprawl’ has been abundantly studied by researchers going far back as World War
II where the major themes related to the issue were summarized in the 1940s (Nechyaba
and Walsh, 2004). Income, population, and housing density are the most important ex-
planatory variables for urban sprawl (Woo and Guldmann, 2010; Alig and Healy, 1987;
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Paulsen, 2014). Alig and Healy (1987) have also used central city population, urbanized
area population outside central cities, change in urban population, and rural population as
explanatory variables for the study. More recent research has tested various urban con-
tainment policies and ownership of housing units for affecting the spatial structure of the
US. (Woo and Guldmann, 2010; Paulsen, 2014). Woo and Guldmann (2010) have regressed
socio-economic characteristics, housing characteristics, transport characteristics - the share
of workers owning one or more cars, and government financial characteristics- by the state
on population and employment density gradients. Paulsen (2014) uses four metrics to mea-
sure urban sprawl- change in urban housing unit density, marginal land consumed per net
new urban household, the density of housing units in newly urbanized areas, and percent of
net new urban housing in previously urbanized areas. The explanatory variables included
were percent of undevelopable land, metropolitan land area, metropolitan percent minority,
residents over 65, housing units built before 1950, general-purpose governments per 100
population, state planning role and Wharton Restrictions Index to measure the effect on
urban sprawl.
There has been some literature related to water resources and urban sprawl. Hatab et al.
(2019) mention that many researchers have argued that water acts as a resource bottleneck
in socio-economic systems. This kind of research has been limited in the economic liter-
ature. This study tries to fill the gap by applying econometric methodologies to analyze
the impacts of a water transfer on the urban sprawl in Los Angeles. Before moving on





The data used in the study for the dependent variable is derived from the historical
Land-cover change and land-use conversions global dataset acquired from NOAA’s Na-
tional Climatic Data Center (Meiyappan and Jain, 2012), and independent variables are
obtained from NHGIS IPUMS for the decennial years 1850-1950.
The main dependent variable used for the analysis is the Urban Sprawl. The spatial data
was converted into a usable format for the analysis using Zonal statistics from ArcGIS.
The landcover map (specifically, urban landcover map) is provided in equal latitude and
longitude earth grids with a spatial resolution of 0.5 by 0.5 in both latitude and longitude.
Urban sprawl is measured in terms of the percentage of the grid cell covered by the urban
land1 in a given year. Hence, it can be interpreted as the percentage of land covered by
urban areas. It has been suggested that the data be used on a global or a continental scale,
but since we required data that goes back to 1850, it provides us with a good estimate of
urban cover in that period. Therefore, urban sprawl is measured as the percentage of the
total land cover in the analysis presented in this study.
Following the previous essay, the counties have to be merged for consistency through-
1The authors who created the urban landcover map used in this analysis retrieved the HYDE 3.1 spatially
explicit urban land area dataset described in Klein Goldewijk et al. (2010). The authors use the term Built-
up Area as "Built-up area is defined here as artificial areas contiguously occupied by humans (therefore not
including vegetative land cover and water, nor roads)." They derived the urban/rural fractions for the USA
from Dodd (1993) and have mentioned the sources for this fraction in the rest of the world as well in their
paper. We mention only the United States in this study given that our study area comprises California.
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out the study period. Hence, the data for the newer counties was aggregated to that of the
counties where they emerged from; for instance, we aggregate the data from orange county
to Los Angeles county. However, few counties were split from more than one county,
for example, the mono county which was formed from Calaveras, Mariposa, and Fresno
counties. Eight such counties were dropped from the analysis.
We summarize descriptive statistics for the variables included in the table given below.
Table 3.1
Descriptive Statistics
Statistic N Mean St. Dev. Min Pctl(25) Pctl(75) Max
Urban Sprawl 189 0.393 1.777 0.000 0.000 0.000 16.378
Percentage of Urban Population 243 29.333 28.440 0.000 0.000 49.113 98.391
Value of land and buildings per capita 108 1,125.589 864.082 28.657 538.106 1,447.289 4,494.966
Persons employed per capita 242 0.034 0.035 0.000 0.008 0.049 0.249
Wages paid per person employed in manufacturing 186 2,965.844 8,270.749 150.664 505.847 1,370.432 88,250.000
Value of farm property per capita 243 829.785 791.121 9.074 289.870 1,113.554 5,079.433
Number of farms per capita 243 0.058 0.031 0.001 0.033 0.080 0.155
Number of farms under 10 acres per capita 243 0.004 0.005 0.000 0.002 0.006 0.034
Number of farms from 10 to 49 acres per capita 243 0.013 0.011 0.0001 0.006 0.017 0.061
Number of farms from 50 to 99 acres per capita 243 0.007 0.005 0.0001 0.004 0.010 0.030
Number of farms under 100 acres per capita 243 0.025 0.017 0.001 0.013 0.034 0.087
Number of farms from 100 to 999 per capita 243 0.028 0.023 0.0001 0.010 0.042 0.121
Number of farms more than 1000 per capita 243 0.004 0.004 0.000 0.001 0.005 0.023
The mean of our main dependent variable is 0.393, which means that the urban sprawl
is 0.393% of the total landcover (as defined in the urban landcover map used). Another
observation from the descriptive statistics table is the discrepancy between the mean and
the maximum value of our main dependent variable, i.e., Urban Sprawl. This indicates
that, although there was a lesser degree of urban sprawl in California on average (since the
mean value of Urban sprawl is low), there was at least one county with a very high degree of
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urban sprawl (since the maximum value of Urban sprawl, i.e., 16.38 is much higher than the
mean, i.e., 0.393) at some point in time. This hypothesis is verified by the difference in the
mean of the urban population, i.e., 29.33%, and the maximum value, i.e., 98.39%. Hence,
the average urban population in California throughout the period was around 30%, whereas
there was at least one county, in which, the urban population was close to 100%. Further
such high differences in the three quartiles, i.e., 150.66, 505.85, and 1370.43, and the
maximum value, i.e., 88250, are observed in Wages per person employed in manufacturing,
indicating the growth in the manufacturing sector and hence, urbanization.
Figure 3.1
Urban Sprawl: The blue line represents the treatment unit, i.e. LA and the gray lines show the
plots for all the other counties. 1920 divides the graph into pre and post-treatment periods where,



















Figure 3.1 shows the plot of Urban Sprawl for all the counties. It seems that the urban
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sprawl is much higher in the treatment unit, i.e., LA as compared to all the other counties.
There were very few counties where urban areas were present during the study period as
can be observed in the graph. We also observe that the increase started in the 1900s which
is before our treatment period. Hence, we perform a difference-in-differences and synthetic
control to investigate the reason for the same.
3.3.2 Empirical strategy
The econometric methodology follows from the previous essay. We use synthetic con-
trol and difference-in-differences analysis to test the impacts of the Owens Valley water
transfer on the urban sprawl; back in the 1900s.
Synthetic Control Method
As explained in the previous essay, the synthetic control method tries to generate a
’synthetic unit’ which minimizes the difference between the synthetic unit and the actual
treatment unit, and then the difference between them in the post-treatment period gives
us the treatment effect (Abadie et al., 2003; Abadie et al., 2010; Akhundjanov, 2019). A
synthetic unit would be constructed using the predictors for the three units, such that it is
the weighted average of the control units included in the study and follows the time plot of
the treatment unit closely. The difference between the outcome variables of the synthetic







it for t > t0
such that α̂1t is the treatment effect in the treatment unit represented by 1. wi is the
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optimal weight in the city i and Yit is the outcome variable in the city i at time t. The
superscript NI indicates the control counties where the intervention does not take place.
Difference-in-Differences
Following the previous essay, we use two specifications for the difference-in-differences
method. The first specification includes the time effects and the second specification in-
cludes both time and individual effects. The dependent variable is urban sprawl.
3.3.3 Empirical results
This section consists of the results from the synthetic control method and difference-
in-differences analysis. The first year included in the analysis is 1890, since that is the first
year when the Californian counties started attaining urban cover. The year 1920 was se-
lected as the treatment year since it was in the early 1920s that the aqueduct was completed
and water started flowing to Los Angeles (Libecap, 2004; 2008). For the synthetic control
analyses, year had to be converted to Period since we use decennial data. Hence period 2
represents the year 1860, period 5 represents the year 1890, and so on. Period 8 represents
the treatment year, i.e., 1920.
I. Synthetic control results
The left side of the figure given below shows the time plot of Urban Sprawl and, the
right side shows a falsification test for the same. From the two figures, we observe that
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there seems to be a striking increase in urban sprawl; however, the increase seems to have
started before the treatment period. One of the reasons for this could be that the county
weights equal to 1 for only one county, i.e., Santa Clara.
Figure 3.2
Time plot (Panel A) and falsification test (Panel B) for Urban Sprawl. The Panel (a) consists of the
time plot for the treatment unit (black) and the control units (gray) for Urban Sprawl. The vertical
line divides the figure into pre and post-treatment period.













































Although there seems to be a rise in urban sprawl in Los Angeles, it is difficult to
construct a reliable synthetic unit since urban sprawl was observed in very few Californian
counties during the study period2. There are very few counties with urban land cover in the
pre-treatment period, because of which, we observe a significant difference in the 1900s.
One of the critical features of Synthetic Control Analysis is that the fit in the pre-treatment
period must be excellent (Ben-Michael et al., 2021), which becomes difficult to achieve
2We applied synthetic control analysis to various sets of predictors. In each specification, Santa Clara
seemed to receive a unit weight.
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for this analysis given the sparse observations in urban sprawl before the treatment year.
Hence, we employ a difference-in-differences analysis as a more appropriate methodology
to further study the rise in urban sprawl in Los Angeles.
II. Difference-in-Differences
This section summarizes our main results from the difference-in-differences analysis.
The main advantage of the difference-in-differences method for our analysis is that we can
compute the treatment effect of the water transfer with the available urban sprawl data. We
employ two specifications: twoways fixed effects and individual fixed effects. Figure 3.3
summarizes the results from our analyses. The black dots in the figure represent the coef-
ficient of the treatment effect, i.e., the effect on urban sprawl if the county is Los Angeles
in the post-treatment period and, the lines represent the confidence interval. The left panel
consists of different specifications, including twoways fixed effects and, the right panel
consists of the same specifications with the individual effects. The different specifications
include different sets of control variables. We use different sets of control variables to en-
sure that the regressions exclude variables that are correlated with each other. The analysis
includes manufacturing control variables, like persons employed per capita, wages paid per
person employed, agricultural control variables like the value of farm property per capita,
number of farms per capita categorized by the farm acreage, percentage of the urban pop-
ulation, and value of land and buildings per capita.
In each specification, we include each control variable by each category except the
variables which are highly correlated with each other. Table 3.3 and Table 3.4 describe
the results for twoways fixed effects and individual fixed effects, respectively, given in
Appendix 3.6.1. From figure 3.3, we observe that the first two specifications have a higher
positive effect on urban sprawl. However, these specifications do not include other control
variables such as manufacturing, agriculture, etc.
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Figure 3.3
The left panel consists of the twoways fixed effects results and the right panel shows the results from
the individual fixed effects models for the whole data set. Tables describing the results in detail are

































The coefficient of the treatment effect in the next eleven specifications included in the
two panels ranges from 4 to 7. This indicates that there was a 4-7 percentage points increase
in urban sprawl in Los Angeles post the water transfer controlling for the manufacturing and
agricultural control variables. The significance of the coefficient can be tested by observing
the black lines in the figure, which show the confidence intervals. Since the intervals are
not close to the "the zero line" (The horizontal black dotted line in Figure 3.3), we can




The left panel consists of the twoways fixed effects results and the right panel shows the results from
the individual fixed effects models for the whole data set. Tables 3.5 and 3.6 describing the results

































We perform another set of difference-in-differences regressions with twoways and in-
dividual fixed effects without the percentage of the urban population. We eliminate the
variable from the analysis since it could be considered as an indicator of urbanization and
hence, influence the results. Figure 3.4 displays the same specifications used in the main
results after removing the percentage of the urban population variable. Tables 3.5 and 3.6
in Appendix 3.6.1 display the results in detail. We observe that most of the coefficients are
similar to the analysis, including the percentage of the urban population. The coefficient of
treatment effect is positive and significant in all the specifications. These results show that
the percentage of the urban population does not bias the main results.
Our estimates are consistent throughout the specifications with different variables whether
time trends are included or not. Hence, it seems that Los Angeles did experience a high
degree of urban sprawl post the Owens Valley water transfer in 1920. In the next section,
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we perform a few robustness checks to corroborate our main results.
Robustness Checks
To demonstrate the sensitivity of our main findings from the previous section, we fit
the twoways and individual fixed effects methods to different subsets of the data. We
create two different subsets based on (i) similarity to Los Angeles in urban population (ii)
by geography. Apart from this, we run the difference-in-differences regression on lagged
independent variables.
A. Subsetting counties by the percentage of urban population
We start subsetting by the urban population, i.e., we observe the impact of water transfer
on counties with a similar percentage of the urban population in the post-treatment period.
We create three datasets where i) counties with higher than 50% of the urban population in
the post-treatment period are included, ii) counties with higher than 30% of the urban popu-
lation in the post-treatment period are included, and iii) counties with the urban population
higher than 70% are included.
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Figure 3.5
The left panel consists of the twoways fixed effects results and right panel shows the results from the
individual fixed effects models for the whole data set. Tables 3.7-3.12 describe the results in detail







































































































The first row in figure 3.5 consists of the coefficient of treatment effect for the dataset
with the urban population higher than 50%, and the next two rows consist of treatment
effect for the dataset with the urban population greater than 30% and 70% respectively
with the left panel consisting of twoways fixed effects and right panel including only the
individual effects. Tables 3.7-3.12 describe the results in detail in appendix 3.6.1.
The black dots in figure 3.5, consistent with previous figures, show the coefficient of
treatment effect and, the lines represent the 95% confidence intervals. The significance
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of the treatment effect can be determined by observing the closeness of the confidence
intervals to the dotted black line (the zero line). We observe that the confidence intervals
are smallest when we include a higher number of counties (i.e. 30%) and largest when there
are a fewer number of counties (i.e. 70%). However, in all specifications (apart from model
10 in the bottom-right), the treatment effect is significant and positive consistently. In the
bottom-right figure, model 10, the treatment effect is significant at 10%, and hence, we
observe the confidence intervals being very close to the dotted zero line. We also observe
that the trend in the magnitude of treatment effect is consistent throughout all the subsets
in various specifications.
A significant and positive treatment effect on data subset where counties similar to
the treatment county (i.e. Los Angeles) are included might indicate that the water transfer
increased Los Angeles’ urban sprawl more than the increase that would have been observed
in its absence. There were other Californian counties which experienced urban sprawl in
the 1900s, but the sprawl in Los Angeles was higher since additional water quantity (from
the Owens Valley) seems to have accelerated the urban sprawl.
B. Subsetting counties by geography (Removing the five northernmost counties)
In the next category of subsets, we include a geographical component. Since Los An-
geles is located in Southern California, we eliminate the 5 northernmost counties. Hence,
the next set of analyses includes 22 southernmost Californian counties.
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Figure 3.6
The left panel consists of the twoways fixed effects results and the right panel shows the results from
the individual fixed effects models for the whole data set. Tables 3.13 and 3.14 describe the results

































Figure 3.6 shows the trend of treatment effect coefficient throughout the 13 specifica-
tions with twoways fixed effects in the left panel and individual fixed effects in the right
panel. Tables 3.13 and 3.14 describe the difference-in-differences results in detail, given in
Appendix 3.6.1.
From the figure, we notice that the confidence intervals are a little larger when agricul-
tural and manufacturing control variables are included compared with the ones observed
in the main analysis. However, the trend of the treatment effect magnitude is similar to
the ones observed in the previous figures. Moreover, the coefficient of treatment effect is
significant in all specifications.
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C. Using Lagged independent variables
Figure 3.7
The left panel consists of the twoways fixed effects results and, the right panel shows the results
from the individual fixed effects models for the whole data set. Tables 3.15 and 3.16 describing the

























In the last set of robustness checks, we use a lag of all independent variables and run
the twoways fixed effects (left panel) and individual fixed effects (right panel) with urban
sprawl as the dependent variable. Figure 3.7 shows the plot of the treatment effect coeffi-
cient, which is positive and significant, consistent with the previous analyses, as shown in
the study. Tables 3.15 and 3.16 in appendix 3.6.1 describe the results in detail.
In conclusion, the analyses included in robustness checks are consistent with the main
results. Although the confidence intervals change in the various subsets of data, the treat-
ment effect coefficient is significant throughout the analyses. Hence, it seems that the urban
sprawl in Los Angeles increased considerably as a result of Owens Valley water transfer.
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3.4 Discussions and Conclusions
The study presented seeks to empirically test the effects of the Owens Valley water
transfer on Urban Sprawl in Los Angeles during the 1900s. We employ the synthetic con-
trol and difference-in-differences methods for our empirical analyses. Our synthetic control
results show that there was an increase in the degree of the urban sprawl of Los Angeles,
although the rise seemed to have begun earlier than the treatment year. Further, it is diffi-
cult to draw causal inference from this analysis since the pre-treatment fit is not excellent
as required due to the lack of urban sprawl data in that period. Therefore, we apply a
difference-in-differences analysis for drawing our inferences. We use specifications with
individual and twoways fixed effects where different groups of variables are included. The
coefficient of the treatment effect is significantly increasing throughout the different spec-
ifications suggesting that the water transfer might have led to an increase in the degree of
the urban sprawl in Los Angeles.
The literature related to urban sprawl and water resources has focused on the impact
of rising urban sprawl on natural resources and the lack of water resources in rural areas,
owing to the increasing transfer of water rights in the urban sector. However, there is not
much empirical evidence on the procurement of water resources for accelerating the process
of urbanization. The research presented above intends to fill this gap in the literature.
Further, we suggest that the decisions regarding water allocation should include a thorough
study of the possible future impacts of such allocation on the parties involved.
In conclusion, the beginning of urban sprawl in Los Angeles in the 1900s may be at-
tributable to the Owens Valley water transfer. Back in 1904, peak summer demand had
reduced the local water reservoir flow from 35,782,000 gallons to 3,494,000 gallons (Os-
trom, 1950). In 2016, reported the water demand was 110 gpcd in a city with a population
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of 10,039,107 as reported by Census (2019). Hence, to ensure proper management of re-
sources with fairness, the distinction between the need and exaggerated demand promoting
excess urbanization must be established. The robustness of our results could be improved
if the study area is expanded through the West.
Due to the limitations of the urban sprawl data in the control counties, we faced issues
in implementing the synthetic control method. In the future, these problems can be solved
by collecting data for longer time periods and expanding the study area throughout the
West.
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3.6 Appendix
3.6.1 Difference-in-Differences
In this section, we present 14 tables that correspond to difference-in-differences results
from the main analysis and robustness checks. Tables 3.3 and 3.4 describe the main results
with twoways and individual fixed effects; tables 3.5 and 3.6 repeat the same analysis
without urban population as the main variable. Tables 3.7-3.12 include robustness checks
when we include the counties similar to Los Angeles in terms of urban population (Tables
3.7 and 3.8 correspond to counties with higher than 50% population in the post-treatment
period, tables 3.9 and 3.10 correspond to counties with higher than 50% population; and
tables 3.11 and 3.12 correspond to counties with higher than 70% population.). The main
reason to include the tables is to corroborate the results shown in the figures and to give a
deeper understanding of the results.
From our control variables, we observe that persons employed per capita are significant
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in the main results (tables 3.3-3.5). However, the coefficient has a negative sign consis-
tently, which means that unemployment increases urban sprawl. Although this might be
surprising, it can be interpreted as a decrease in labor population per capita means that
there is a higher concentration of labor population in the economy.
The main observation, however, from the table is that the treatment coefficient holds
up as positive and significant, as shown in the figures throughout the main results and






































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































NASH BARGAINING MODEL FOR FAIR WATER ALLOCATION:
ENSURING OVERALL GAINS
4.1 Introduction
Early evidence of a water transfer from one region to another was found when Los An-
geles transferred water through pipelines from the Owens Valley in California. Los Angeles
sought after water from Owens lake, amongst other sources owing to its population growth
in the 1920s. Such a transfer was possible only through buying the land since the water
rights were tied to land ownership. When the farmers became aware of their intentions,
they alleged that Los Angeles officials had stolen their water. Further, the farmers’ appeal
to the press about the inequities left lasting perceptions of injustice in the water transfer
(Libecap, 2008).
Water markets and water trade emerged as informal contracting where the owner with
some form of water right could authorize the other party to access the same. In the past 20
years, water markets have developed in countries like Chile, Mexico, the US, and Australia
(Libecap, 2008). Grafton et al. (2011) make a comparison of water markets in the US West
and Australia. They suggested that policy attention must focus on promoting water trade
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while simultaneously mitigating the legitimate third-party concerns about how and where
water is used, especially the conflicts between consumptive and in-situ uses of water. In
Australia, surface statutory water rights in the Murray-Darling basin are defined in terms of
divisions per irrigation season which are separate from the land rights. The water markets
provided the highest benefit to the irrigators in this area when trade allowed high-value
irrigation users to continue irrigating because of the transfers from broad-acre agriculture
(Grafton et al., 2011).
There are a few researchers who are not in favor of water markets (Chong and Sund-
ing, 2006). Chong and Sunding (2006) mention four debates central to water transfer and
water trading. The first, water transfer means reallocation from agriculture-to-urban uses;
the second, transfers result in large economic losses for the areas of origin, the third, inter-
basin trade should be prohibited because of large hydrologic effects, and the last, water is a
public good and should not be subject to market forces. However, Barbier and Chaudhary
(2013) model water and growth in the agricultural economy showing that a decline in wa-
ter availability would not affect agricultural output or welfare unless they belong to water
constrained" or are pushed to a "water-constrained " economy; water-constrained economy
being the one where water in the economy is limited to fulfilling the needs. Hence, water al-
location calls for a thorough scientific investigation ensuring that regions or the economies
involved receive a net benefit.
This essay seeks to compute the welfare impacts of water sharing between two regions.
Using game theory and general equilibrium analysis, we derive the welfare impacts of water
sharing between the Cache county and Wasatch Front in the north-central part of Utah. The
Bear River Development Project proposed by the Utah Division of Water Resources has
been entrusted with the development of the surface waters of Bear River and its tributaries.
Under the BRDP, the Divison of Water Resources is expected to develop water resources
to distribute them to the Wasatch Front and Cache county. Our results show that Wasatch
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Front and Cache Valley would be willing to pay for the water-sharing agreement if the costs
are shared equally amongst the counties involved.
The main contribution of the study is a straightforward application of the Nash Bar-
gaining Solution to the general equilibrium and a comparison of the welfare measures to
the costs provided by the Bear River Development Project. From the policy perspective,
the essay seeks to propose a strategy to ensure that both the counties involved in sharing the
Bear river water derive the same or greater welfare as it was before such an arrangement.
Using a benefit-cost analysis, the question we seek to answer is: whether the involved re-
gions’ willingness to pay for the water-sharing agreement covers the costs of the Bear River
Development Project.
The remainder of the essay is outlined as follows. In the next section, we briefly de-
scribe the Nash Bargaining model and its application in water economics. The third section
outlines our conceptual model. We then describe our data and calibration methodology, fol-
lowed by simulation results. The final section discusses our main findings, the implication
for policy, and further research.
4.2 Background
Various models have been applied for water resources allocation like simulation meth-
ods, optimization methods, game theory, etc. However, game theory has been dominantly
used for studying water resource allocation. This is because the allocation of resources
has more than two concerned agents, who either simultaneously or sequentially make the
decisions regarding the quantity of water they want to use and the purposes of water use.
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Hence, game theory serves as an important tool to study water allocation. Different re-
searchers have classified these studies in different ways. Madani (2010) divided game
theory into five parts, i.e., water or benefit allocation among water users, groundwater
management, transboundary water allocation, water quality management, and other types
of resource management. Dinar et al. (2015) divided the application of game theory in
the conflict of water resources allocation into three aspects: (1) the application of non-
cooperative negotiation theory in water resources allocation (2) the application of graph
model in water resources allocation conflict (3) application of Nash-Harsanyi bargaining
theory to water resources allocation problem. Leader-follower models, Bankruptcy mod-
els, and the Nash–Harsanyi model, which is an extension of the Nash Bargaining model,
are few other modeling techniques used by researchers to study water allocation.
Han et al. (2018) use a multi-agent model with hydrological constraints to resolve a
water conflict in the HanJiang river basin. They developed a bilevel optimization model of
common interest and a multi-agent cooperative GT-based optimization model. The paper
suggested that the policymakers realize the needs and acceptable values of agents and adjust
the same according to their feedback.
The branch of game theory that deals with situations related to negotiations for sharing
goods is called bargaining theory. The main issue that the players face is setting up an
agreement that dictates the terms of cooperation. The main focus of bargaining theories is
on the efficiency and distribution of bargaining properties (Muthoo, 2001). The literature
has typically relied on two main bargaining theories: Nash’s axiomatic bargaining solu-
tion and Rubinstein’s solution to the infinite-horizon bargaining with the alternating offers
(Yildiz, 2011). In the given study, we use the Nash bargaining model to find a cooperative
solution to water sharing between two regions.
The Nash bargaining model
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Nash (1953) presented a bargaining theory with a strong foundation in economics. It
is an n-player game used to model bargaining interactions. He assumed that there are
n decision-makers. Osborne and Rubinstein (1990) and Nash (1953) have discussed the
properties of the Nash Bargaining model as explained below. Let X be the decision space
and fi: X → R be the objective function of decision-maker i.
The model also assumes that when decision-makers cannot reach an agreement, they
will get low objective values. Nash denotes this value with di for each decision-maker i and
assumes d = (d1,d2. . .dn) (Osborne and Rubinstein, 1990; Nash 1953).
Osborne and Rubinstein(1990) mention that the Nash bargaining solution f* can be
obtained as a unique solution to the problem :
max
f1,..., fn
( f1−d1)( f2−d2). . . .( fn−dn)
s.t. x
fi ≥ di, i = 1,2, . . . .,n
Hence, the stakeholders make their decisions collectively by solving the maximization
problem stated above (Nash 1953; Osborne and Rubinstein, 1990). In addition to this,
the Nash bargaining model satisfies some desirable axioms like efficiency, symmetry, scale
covariance, and independence of irrelevant alternatives (Clippel, 2007).
The Nash bargaining solution gives us a unique way to allocate water more efficiently
and equitably. When there are two regions under purview, both would have a comparative
advantage over one another in a particular sector where one might need more water than
the other. In turn, it can benefit the other region by providing the resources that it might
require. As a result, both end up benefiting from the trade and reaching a Pareto optimal
91
solution. A constraint of the Nash Bargaining solution ensures that the benefit derived
from bargaining is never less than that under non-cooperation. Harsanyi (1958) presents an
extension to the Nash Bargaining model where the author extended the two-person Nash
bargaining solution to the n-person Nash Harsanyi model. There are studies where a model
for trading between more than one region or agent is possible. This model is useful when
water is shared and allocated for more than one agent.
4.3 Model Specification: The algebra of water sharing
This section consists of the Nash Bargaining model that we seek to build in the study
along with an autarky model.
The current study includes two regions: Cache Valley and Wasatch Front (denoted as
CA and WF). We assume that the economy consumes two goods: the agricultural good and
the composite good, i.e., ADi and C
D
i respectively, where i= CA, WF. Let x ji and k ji be the
two inputs for production, i.e., water and composite input 1 where, j is the sector for which
the input is used and, i is the region in which it is used. All the models are expressed as
constrained maximization problems. Both the economies aim at maximizing their utility
while minimizing the costs of production simultaneously. It is assumed that there is a unit
price in the composite sector and, the relative price in the agriculture sector is denoted by
PAi. Factor mobility is assumed in all the models.
I. The Autarkic model
1In theory, composite input includes land, capital and labor. However, in the numerical simulation, we
include only labor and capital due to data constraints.
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We start building what we call an "Autarky Model" where no water sharing is assumed.
These regions have a limited supply of water. We consider a small, closed economy with
a Cobb-Douglas utility function since it is the most common function used in the general












s.t. Wi =CDi +PAiA
D
i , i = 1,2 (4.2)
where Vi(ADi ,C
D
i ) represents the utility obtained by region i after consuming the two
goods, Wi is the income (Regional Gross Domestic Product) of the region, αi is the cobb-
douglas parameter and δi which is the parameter for residual change in the demand not
affected by the preference of goods.
We can derive optimal demands for agricultural and composite goods as follows:
(ADi )
∗ = αiWi/PAi (4.3)
(CDi )
∗ = (1−αi)Wi (4.4)
The firms in region i= CA, WF choose to minimize the costs of inputs, rxxAi + rkkAi




Ai for the agriculture sector




Ci . rx and rk are respectively input prices for water and composite
input. θi is and γi are the parameters for technical change; and β ji is the cobb-douglas
parameter. The reason for choosing a cobb-douglas function remains the same- being one
of the most widely used production functions in economics given the fact that it adheres to
2The First-Order Conditions are shown in Appendix 4.8.1
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most of the assumption made in the producer theory of economics.









Positive production is assumed in both regions. Accordingly, there are three sets of
equilibrium conditions: the zero profit condition, the market-clearing conditions, and the
constraints on the two inputs, i.e., composite input and water. Ki is the composite input
available in a region for both agricultural and composite purposes. Wi is the water available
in a region for both agricultural and composite sectors. The market-clearing conditions por-
tray that the aggregate demand is equal to aggregate supply in the economy. The equations
are shown as below:
The zero-profit condition





The constraint on composite input and water














Solving these equations would give the optimal values of the demands in the agricul-
tural and composite sector, the optimal values of inputs used in the agricultural and com-
posite sectors, the optimal values of the prices of the water and composite input values
used, and the optimal value of the price of agriculture in each region. However, these are
the values for each region when there is no co-operation. The data that we use to arrive at
these values and the simulation procedure would be explained in the next section.
II. The Proposed Nash Bargaining model
Essentially, the purpose of the autarky model is to derive the values of V̄i which gives the
utility when there is no agreement for water sharing. Such a value is required to compute a
disagreement point, i.e., the utility value which is lower than the one achieved in the non-
cooperation scenario. Hence, the intuition for the Nash Bargaining model is fairly simple,
water sharing would be possible if and only if the utility derived by both the regions, i.e.,
Vi is greater than V̄i. Hence, the Nash Bargaining solution which would be the objective

























The production sector and the equilibrium conditions remain the same apart from the
constraint for water. To allow water sharing between the two regions, we combine the water
constraint from both the regions in the following way,
R1X1 +R2X2 = xa1 + xa2 + xc1 + xc2 (4.15)
where Ri is the rate of increase in the quantity of water in region i.
We compute the value of water transfer using the equation below.
wvaluei = (1+ ti)(rXi(RiXi− (xAi + xCi))) (4.16)
where wvaluei is the value of the water transfer in region i and ti is the tax on the
water-sharing agreement. The term RiXi− (xAi + xCi) represents the amount of water that
is transferred from/to each region and the equation shows the value of water transferred.
Hence, the value of water transfer is simply the value of water post the water-sharing agree-
ment that is available after use for each region including any tax/subsidy that is imposed on
the agreement.
We incorporate the value of water transfer in the income equation. The "income" of the
water-exporting region is reduced since it gives up the value of water that is transferred to
the other region. Hence, the income equation is given below:
Wi =CDi +PAA
D
i − (1+ ti)(rXi(riXi− (xAi + xCi))) (4.17)
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Additionally, we now allow trade in the agricultural sector between the two regions to
capture embodied water. Embodied water is another way to trade water between the two re-
gions. Hence, the market-clearing condition which equated region 1’s agricultural demand
to region 1’s agricultural supply (refer to equation 4.10) changes to equating aggregate








with the same price PA in both the economies.




is the wealth under Nash Bargaining solution and W is income in autarky. We
replace W using the utility equation and the optimal levels of ADi and C
D









where CVi is the Compensating Variation for region i.
4.4 Calibration and Simulation results
Data for Calibration
The main variables used for simulating the Nash Bargaining model from the previous
section are as follows: Agricultural production, Composite sector production, Gross Do-
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mestic Product values, Population, and capital used in agricultural and composite sector,
respectively. Table 4.1 describes the sources for the data. We obtained these variables from
the IMPLAN dataset. In this study, we aggregated the 500 sectors in the IMPLAN dataset






Consumption United States Geological Survey (USGS)
Prices Edwards et al. (2017)
Capital IMPLAN
GDP IMPLAN
We obtained the data for water use from a United States Geological Survey report
(USGS, 2017) in a million gallons per day and the data for water prices from Edwards
et al. (2017). We converted the data to acre-foot per day from million gallons per day. We
further computed the dollar value of water to maintain consistency with our other variables.
Calibrating the model
The autarky model constructed in the specification section performs an additional role.
It helps us to retrieve the values of the unobserved parameters in the real-time data for cal-
ibration. Kynland and Prescott (1982) were the pioneers for calibrating theoretical models
in economics. They first applied this methodology to the real business cycles (Kynland and
Prescott, 1982).
Hence, we start with compiling the data to create what is called a Social Accounting
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Matrix (SAM), which is conceptually an extension of the input-output table. Input-output
tables describe the flows of the value of goods and services between all the individual sec-
tors of the national economy over a certain time period (Martana et al., 2012). These tables
are extended to a SAM by including the relationships between production factors and final
demands, showing the amount of income distributed to households and government as well
as transferred abroad and invested (Martana et al., 2012). Therefore, a social accounting
matrix is a system of representing the transactions involving the movement of goods and
factors of production; and the corresponding flows of payments. Since every payment by
an agent in the economic system represents a receipt to some other agent in the system, the
rows and columns of a social accounting matrix must be balanced.
Below is the Social accounting matrix derived by the data that was collected from vari-
ous sources as mentioned above:
Table 4.2
Unbalanced Social Accounting Matrix for cache Valley
CACHE COUNTY
AGRICULTURAL GOOD COMPOSITE GOOD WATER COMPOSITE INPUT HOUSEHOLD TOTAL
AGRICULTURAL GOOD 47475653.57 47475653.57
COMPOSITE GOOD 4871939330 4871939330
WATER 11012.746 3384.757 14361.503
COMPOSITE INPUT 191692.5511 3128751 3320443.551
HOUSEHOLD 14631.5 3320443.9 3335075.4
TOTAL 202705.2971 3132099.757 14631.5 3320443.9 4919414984
Table 4.3
Unbalanced Social Accounting Matrix for Wasatch Front
WASATCH FRONT
AGRICULTURAL GOOD COMPOSITE GOOD WATER COMPOSITE INPUT HOUSEHOLD TOTAL
AGRICULTURAL GOOD 38184801.25 38184801.25
COMPOSITE GOOD 28173176520 28173176520
WATER 12561.26 12161.19 24722.45
COMPOSITE INPUT 124980.7 18604452 18729432.7
HOUSEHOLD 24722.45 18729432 18754154.45
TOTAL 137541.96 18616613 24722.45 18729432 28211361321 28248869631
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From the two tables, we observe that the Social Accounting Matrix is not balanced,
which is common in literature since the data is obtained from different sources or statistical
discrepancies. It could also be because variations in the data availability make it necessary
to combine the data from different periods (Goulder and Hafstead, 2013; Gilbert and Tower,
2012). We incorporate water use data from 2015 and the rest of the data from 2017 in our
dataset.
RAS procedure for balancing the Social Accounting Matrix
We employ the RAS procedure for balancing the social accounting matrices of the
regions involved. In this method, we scale the row and column entries to reach the target
row and column sums using the GAMS software3 (Gilbert and Tower, 2012). Following
social accounting matrices are obtained once we use the RAS procedure:
Table 4.4
Balanced Social Accounting Matrix for Cache County
CACHE COUNTY
AGRICULTURAL GOOD COMPOSITE GOOD WATER COMPOSITE INPUT HOUSEHOLD TOTAL
AGRICULTURAL GOOD 47475650 47475650
COMPOSITE GOOD 4871939000 4871939000
WATER 6592720 14592980 21185700
COMPOSITE INPUT 40882930 4857346000 4898228930
HLD 21185700 4898228950 4919414650
TOTAL 47475650 4871938980 21185700 4898228950 4919414650
Table 4.5
Balanced Social Accounting Matrix for Wasatch Front
WASATCH FRONT
AGRICULTURAL GOOD COMPOSITE GOOD WATER COMPOSITE INPUT HOUSEHOLD TOTAL
AGRICULTURAL GOOD 38184798.97 38184798.97
COMPOSITE GOOD 28173172820 28173172820
WATER 5617878.968 31572820 37190698.97
COMPOSITE INPUT 32566920 28141600000 28174166920
HOUSEHOLD 37190698.97 28174166920 28211357619
TOTAL 38184798.97 28173172820 37190698.97 28174166920 28211357619
3We use a for-loop command in GAMS-IDE version 24.7.4 for balancing the social accounting matrix
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We can observe from the tables that our Social Accounting Matrices balance.
The given study consists of five parameters for the Nash bargaining model, i.e., β ji: the
parameter on cobb-douglas production functions, αi: the parameter on cobb-douglas utility
function, θi: the parameter for technical change in the composite production function, γi:
the parameter for technical change in the agricultural production function and δi which is
the parameter for residual change in demand not affected by the preference of goods.
We can use the consumption, production, input use, and endowment values to compute
the parameter values from the autarky model using equations 4.1-4.11. Finally, we can
input the calculated parameter values in the equations for the Nash Bargaining model to
observe the changes in the economy when there is a water agreement. Hence, the objective
of the calibration exercise is achieved by balancing the Social accounting matrices for both
the regions and computing the parameter values.
Simulation Results
We enter the calibrated values of the parameters in the Nash Bargaining model to de-
rive the simulated variables. We start discussing the results with the Nash Bargaining model
with a 10% increase in the water quantity in Cache Valley and a 1% increase in the Wasatch
Front. The quantities are increased following the Bear River Development Project, which
aims at developing the surface water resources of the Bear River and its tributaries. Since
the values for water use, aggregate supply, aggregate demand, etc., are in dollars, we nor-
malize all the prices to be 1.
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Table 4.6
Nash bargaining results when water quantity increase by 10% in Cache Valley and 1% in
Wasatch Front
Wasatch Front results Autarky ( in $) Nash Bargaining (in $) Percentage change
Agricultural demand 38235.39 38580.84 3.45
Composite Demand 28173149.41 28173192.07 0.43
Water use in agriculture 5624.35 6072.86 4.49
Water use in composite sector 31566.35 32853.71 12.87
Utility for Wasatch Front 2792216.46 2792254.72 0.38
Income 28211386.97 28212735.35 13.48
Value of water transfer -1306.66
Compensating Variation per capita 3.534
Cache Valley results Autarky (in $) Nash Bargaining (in $) Percentage change
Agricultural demand 47919.33 48385.89 4.67
Composite Demand 4871496 4873091.48 15.95
Water use in agriculture 6608.36 6732.19 1.24
Water use in composite sector 14630.21 15266.28 6.36
Utility for Cache Valley 2328484 2329459 9.75
Income 4919434 4919739 3.05
Value of water transfer 1306.66
Compensating Variation per capita 6.075
The table shows the results for the Wasatch Front and Cache Valley from the Autarky
and Nash Bargaining Models. We consider the case when the increase in surface water
resources in Cache Valley is 10% and in Wasatch Front is 1%. The main observation
from the table is an increase in all the variables in both economies. This seems to be
obvious, given the increase in water resources in both the economies under the Bear River
Development Project. Hence, we include a percentage change in all variables from Autarky
to Nash Bargaining in the last column to observe the impacts of the project and the Nash
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bargaining agreement on the two regions.
Although water-use increases in both the economies, the increase in composite sector
water-use of Wasatch Front is higher as compared to the region’s agricultural sector as
well as water use in Cache Valley. This result seems reasonable because the additional
water from new local water resources and water transferred from Cache Valley might be
diverted to urban development in Wasatch Front. Hence, additional resources would be
utilized towards the sectors apart from agriculture. High percentage changes in water use
are not observed in Cache Valley; however, there is a high percentage change in demand
for composite goods. This indicates that the benefit received by the Cache Valley from the
water sharing agreement is translated into the growth of the composite sector in the county.
Further, we observe a positive value of water transfer in Cache Valley, which indicates
that it is the water exporting region and a negative value of water transfer in Wasatch Front
showing that it is the water importing region. High growth in income (Gross Domestic
Product) is noticed in the Wasatch Front region. The main reason for such high growth is
the additional value added by the water import from Cache Valley. The percentage increase
in the utility of Cache Valley is observed to be relatively higher, perhaps, from the growth
in the composite sector.
Finally, we observe a positive compensating variation per capita in both the regions with
higher compensating variation per capita in Wasatch Front. This result indicates that the
water-importing region has a higher willingness to pay for the water-sharing agreement. In
conclusion, both the economies, i.e., Cache County and Wasatch Front, obviously seem to
be doing better with a water-sharing agreement and additional water resources built under
the Bear River Development Project.
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4.5 Sensitivity Analysis
Table 4.7 shows the percentage changes in variables with an increase in the percentage
of water quantity. In this section, we will present a brief cost-benefit analysis to ascertain
the feasibility of the Bear River Development Project.
Table 4.7
Results from Nash Bargaining Model
Cache Valley r1=0.2 ( in %) r1=0.3 ( in %) r1=0.4( in %) r1=0.5 ( in %) r=0.6 ( in %) r=0.7 ( in %) r=0.8
Agricultural demand 9.02 13.17 17.10 20.86 24.46 27.90 31.20
Composite demand 31.04 45.04 59.04 71.22 83.04 94.60 105.51
Water use in agriculture 2.30 3.36 4.42 5.47 6.52 7.57 8.61
Water use in composite sector 12.46 18.56 24.66 30.77 36.86 42.97 49.07
Utility for Cache Valley 19.16 27.16 36.16 43.40 51.16 57.67 64.29
Wealth 5.66 8.66 11.66 14.76 17.66 20.87 23.92
Value of water transfer 25.4507 36.8558 47.3954 57.166 66.25 74.7186 82.633
Compensating Variation per capita 11.67119 17.1479 22.50223 27.73349 32.84254 37.83129 42.70223
Wasatch Front r1=0.2 ( in %) r1=0.3 ( in %) r1=0.4( in %) r1=0.5 ( in %) r=0.6 ( in %) r=0.7 ( in %) r=0.8 ( in %)
Agricultural demand 6.81 10.00 13.03 15.92 18.69 21.34 23.88
Composite Demand 2.7 4 5.6 7.5 10 12.05 14.62
Water use in agriculture 9.09 13.69 18.29 22.89 27.49 32.08 36.67
Water use in composite sector 26.06 39.25 52.45 65.66 78.87 92.09 105.31
Utility for Wasatch Front 0.83 0.83 1.83 2.14 2.83 3.10 3.59
Wealth 26.1303 36.1303 56.1303 63.1714 76.1303 85.2785 95.7685
Value of water transfer -25.4508 -36.8558 -47.3954 -57.166 -66.25 -74.7186 -82.633
Compensating Variation per capita 6.98313 10.27459 13.42336 16.44217 19.3421 22.13275 24.82258
From the table, we observe that the trends with an increase in water quantity are consis-
tent. In Cache Valley, the highest percentage changes are observed in demand for composite
goods and utility (probably, driven by the composite sector growth). Apart from that, we
observe that there is a considerable increase in composite sector water use at higher levels
of percentage increase in water quantity.
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In Wasatch Front, we observe that the highest changes are observed in composite sec-
tor water use and income. As mentioned in the previous section, the increase in income
seems to be driven by the additional water received by the region. Also, the growth of the
composite sector is not surprising since Wasatch Front is primarily an urban economy.
The main conclusion from the table is that new generating facilities and a water-sharing
agreement would improve the economies for both regions; however, the social welfare
estimates must be compared with the cost estimates to examine the feasibility of the project
and the net social welfare.
The Project has proposed the following costs for each county. The costs are shown in
the per-capita form.
Table 4.8




Equally shared costs 31.861
A comparison between the per-capita willingness-to-pay and the costs proposed show
that the influx of water has to be much higher even to reach a break-even point as shown
in figure 4.1. However, we propose another way of sharing costs to ensure positive net
benefits for each county. Instead of sharing different costs for different counties, the costs
of the whole project could be shared by the counties involved equally.
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Figure 4.1
Willingness to pay for the water sharing agreement. Costs retrieved from Utah Division of Water
Resources (2019).




































The bold lines in Figure 4.1 show the willingness-to-pay-per-capita and, the dotted
lines show the costs per capita. We observe a high discrepancy between the blue and
red bold and dotted lines. This discrepancy suggests that the costs proposed by the Bear
River Development Project are much higher as compared to the willingness to pay for the
development of the resources in the two regions. From the figure, we also observe that
the willingness-to-pay for the water-sharing agreement is less flatter in Cache valley. This
indicates that the willingness-to-pay is more sensitive in Cache Valley as compared with
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Wasatch Front to an increase in the quantity of water. This might be because a higher
increase in water quantity would indicate that there is excess water supply remaining after
local water use in Cache Valley. Hence, the higher the increase in the water quantity, the
higher is the willingness to pay for the water-sharing agreement. On the other hand, the
willingness to pay for Wasatch Front is flatter. Since Wasatch Front is relatively water-
scarce compared to Cache County, it is willing to pay for the water-sharing agreement even
at lower levels of water quantity increase in the Cache County (even if it means a lesser
amount of water transferred).
Hence, we propose an alternate cost-sharing scenario. Instead of attributing separate
costs to each county, the total costs of the project could be shared equally among all the
counties benefiting from the development of water resources. The black dotted line shows
the costs per capita when they are shared equally among the counties involved. The rela-
tively steeper willingness-to-pay of Cache county breaks even with the costs at around 60
percent increase in the water quantity. However, we observe that even with costs shared
equally, a considerable amount of water increase in Cache county is required by Wasatch
Front to arrive at a break-even point with the costs.
Another suggestion would be to use side payments to transfer the positive net benefits
from one region to another where such benefits exist. Side payments in the model devel-
oped in this study would be in form of inducing taxes or other costs on the region where
a positive net benefit is observed or offering a subsidy (reducing the costs) for the region
with no net benefits. Side payments have been increasingly used in game theory for induc-
ing the parties to take part in the agreement (Kimbrough and Sheremeta, 2012). They can
play a major role in the Bear River Development Program, ensuring that both the regions,
i.e., Cache County and Wasatch Front benefit from the development of new surface water
resources as proposed by the project.
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4.6 Discussions and Conclusions
We apply the Nash Bargaining Solution to a General Equilibrium model developed in
the essay and compare the derived social welfare to the costs proposed by the Bear River
Development Project. The Bear River Development Project seeks to develop water re-
sources in Cache and Box Elder counties and pump some of the water from these resources
to the counties in Wasatch Front. We use compensation variation/ willingness-to-pay as the
measure for computing the social welfare of the involved counties. Our results show that
there is an increase in welfare with a water-sharing agreement between the two counties.
However, it is essential that the costs of the Bear River Development Project be shared
equally or the region without any net benefit be supported by side payments so that the
project leads to positive net social welfare for both regions. We compute the social welfare
when water-sharing takes place, and compare it to the costs proposed in the project. We in-
tend to ascertain the compensation ensuring that the benefits derived by the parties involves
are higher than the costs incurred by them for the project.
This analysis attempts to inform the policy of alternative methods either in the cost-
sharing, side payments, the development of resources, or a combination of the three strate-
gies to ensure that all the parties involved benefit from the Bear River Development Project.
Typically, implementation of such projects where water is pumped to another county leads
to dissatisfaction among the residents of the water-supplying county since they believe that
they do not benefit from sharing their resources. Hence, a scientific method could ensure
efficiency and equity when such projects are executed. The study presented in this essay
is an attempt to apply a popular bargaining approach to compute social welfare from a
water-sharing agreement between two regions. We employ a general equilibrium setup and
use numerical simulation, given the advantages of using limited data and being flexible to
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combine data from different years.
With water sharing and water trade becoming common trends in the present-day world,
a thorough analysis of the welfare impacts of such projects is indispensable. In most parts
of the world, such agreements take place based on negotiations by the concerned parties
resulting in conflict at various levels (Rani and Rani, 2002; Fadel et al., 2003). Researchers
from various backgrounds like hydrology, engineering, etc. have attempted to use decision
and game theory to provide a scientific basis for agreements including water-sharing and
water trade (Madani, 2010; Han et al., 2018). However, further developments and a wider
application of these studies are required in economics ( Madani, 2010).
The study applied one of the most popular approaches of game theory to a water allo-
cation problem. However, it must be noted that our results apply in the absence of envi-
ronmental costs. Utah might have observed an increase in winter precipitation; however,
it does not lead to a long-term increase in the state’s snowpack (Wang et al., 2012). With
the current drought faced by the Western US, climate change becomes an important factor
that needs to be considered for such water allocation. A national climate assessment report
(Garfin et al., 2013) states that "We can no longer rely on the past for making the future
decisions. It further claims that the long period of warm summers and prolonged droughts
would further reduce the water availability and impact the surface water quality. Although,
the larger water utilities have started adopting measures for adapting to climate change,
examining both demand and supply-side solutions; such measures are yet to be undertaken
by the smaller utilities.
Further, there are many different approaches within the game theory that could be ap-
plied to such issues. One of the drawbacks of the study is also the exclusion of transaction
costs. This problem could be solved in the future by developing more complicated models
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This dissertation contributes to a better understanding of the current literature by an-
alyzing various aspects of water transfers and water-sharing using both the application of
econometric and numerical simulation techniques to examine the impacts and the feasibil-
ity of such transfers.
The first essay analyzes the impacts of the water transfer on the economic growth and
manufacturing sector of Los Angeles. Our findings show that the Gross Domestic Product
per Capita and Manufacturing Product per capita are higher in the presence of the water
transfer. In addition, we observe no impact on the Agricultural Product per Capita in Los
Angeles. These results suggest that the increase in economic growth was higher in the
presence of a water transfer. A key solution to the water allocation problems could be
a careful examination of the impacts and cost-benefit analyses to ensure fairness, equity,
and efficiency. The main contribution of the essay is an empirical analysis of a water
transfer that began a century ago and has continued to the present day. We aim to provide
critical evidence on the impacts of a water transfer which created an aversion towards future
agricultural to urban or rural to urban water transfers.
The second essay extends the previous study by observing the impact of the transfer on
urban sprawl. The negotiations related to water transfer have been based on lobbying by the
government officials instead of research and careful examination of the facts. This study
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intends to emphasize the importance of the impact of resource allocation on urbanization in
an economy. We use various difference-in-differences specifications and robustness checks
based on subsets of the main dataset based on i)similarity to the treatment unit based on
the percentage of urban population and ii) geographic location. We also include a model
with lagged independent variables as a part of the robustness check. Our results show
that the coefficient of our treatment effect is positive and significant throughout all models
indicating that there was indeed a rise in the degree of urban sprawl as a result of the water
transfer.
The third essay applies the Nash bargaining theory to a general equilibrium model
computing the welfare impacts from sharing water between Cache County and Wasatch
Front. We derive the compensating variation as a social welfare measure and compare it
to the costs proposed under the Bear River Development Project. The project is seeking
to develop additional water resources in Cache County and Box Elder County and divert
a share of additional resources from both the counties to the Wasatch Front region. Our
findings indicate that such a transfer would be beneficial only if the generating capacity
of additional resources is much higher than the current water supply. As an alternative
strategy, we suggest an equitable sharing of the total costs of the project. However, the
implications of such a water development program on the worsening conditions of Utah
Snowpack must be taken into consideration. The essay aims to make a contribution to
the literature by applying a game-theoretic approach to a general equilibrium model and a
cost-benefit type analysis for water allocation.
To conclude, water trade and water sharing are inevitable in the near future. Currently,
such negotiations are based on persuasions and campaigns by government officials even
after the existence of water markets in the Western US. A scientific method for water allo-
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